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# 21

The 17th Broadyard Workshop  
Ethnographies on European and American  
Societies and Cultures  
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INSTITUTE OF AREA STUDIES PEKING UNIVERSITY

**Academic Bulletin**

## **Moderator's introduction to the workshop**

Nowadays, Chinese anthropologists are carrying out overseas social fieldwork all over the world, and they are concentrating their research on areas of European and American societies. This is of significant importance for the development of China's anthropology as well as area studies. The primary job of social sciences is to conduct research on real persons and societies, and the reason why social sciences first evolved in the West is that sociology and anthropology—which undertake the task of first-hand research—were developed in the West at an earlier time. The science of anthropology grew as European powers began their global expansion during the Age of Exploration, and gradually developed into an influential discipline worldwide. However, world anthropology was for a long time almost synonymous with European and American anthropology, as it mostly comprised observations and studies conducted by scholars from those regions on non-Western peoples and societies. Although anthropology was introduced into China more than a century ago, studies targeted at Western European and North American societies have always been lacking. Therefore, it is worth mentioning that during Chinese anthropology's endeavour to augment its reserve of overseas ethnographies in the past two decades, it has produced more than 20 academic outputs in which specific communities in European and American countries were studied by participant observation. Chinese anthropology has thus become a new contributor to the plurality of “world anthropologies” and is a pioneering force of Chinese social sciences in its research into the societies of the world.

Just as participant observation of Chinese societies is a part of European and American anthropology's studies of the other, we have started to form innovative teams to conduct in-depth participant observation in European and American societies. Thus, we have shifted from being the subject of European and

American anthropology's contemplation to being the contemplator of the other party, and by this transformation we have set the foundation for a new type of relationship in knowledge production. How to utilize this new relationship to help fulfil the function of social sciences is an important topic for further discussions.

The subject of each ethnography is unique in its own way; it is a miniature of the society it comes from, as well as a testimony to the possibilities of ourselves as a species. Anthropological studies must treat its observation subjects in a way that reveals their uniqueness as individuals, groups, communities of a certain country, creative practitioners of a certain culture, and representatives of the cultural diversity of humankind. The value of studying Europe and America lies not only in that it will allow us to improve our understanding of their societies and cultures, but also in that it can help us realize our own limitations and possibilities, reflect back on our past and look forward into our future.

We study "the Other" with the aim of eventually transforming "the Other" into our partner in dialogue. Peers from China and from Europe and America becoming dialogue partners with each other in the field of knowledge is a prerequisite for our societies to engage amicably. Therefore, European and American social and cultural studies for us is both an academic subject and a practical problem.

Gao Bingzhong

March 1, 2019

**The 17th Broadyard Workshop**  
**Ethnographies on European and American**  
**Societies and Cultures**  
**February 25, 2019**

The 17th Broadyard Workshop was convened by Prof. Gao Bingzhong of the Department of Sociology of Peking University, with ten experts and scholars from the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Renmin University, Chongqing University, Jinan University, and East China Normal University participating in the discussion. Prof. Qian Chengdan, director of PKU's Institute of Area Studies (PKUIAS), recalled in his speech that PKUIAS held a workshop on fieldwork in Asian countries in November 2018 with a focus on neighbouring countries, and pointed out that the workshop this time—on anthropological fieldwork on European and American societies and cultures—was an extension of that workshop, in which the region studied and under discussion expands further. He noted that among the participants of the workshop were many young Chinese scholars in the field who had been looking deeply into their object countries of study, stayed there for extended periods of time, delved into the lower strata of the society and engaged in detailed discussions on deep topics. He also extended a warm welcome to the two foreign young scholars present at the workshop, commenting apropos that there were no borders in the academic field.

Prof. Gao Bingzhong mentioned the achievements of Chinese anthropology in his opening speech, pointing out that fieldwork done by researchers in almost ascetic circumstances in various spots around the world and their resulting consequential academic reports have earned the recognition of Chinese social sciences. Anthropology's job is to study "the Other" and, by doing so, to transform "the Other" to "us," which is both a mandate of the current stage of world history and a natural result

of the application of the methodologies peculiar to anthropology. He remarked that it might seem strange in anthropology for Chinese researchers to study European or American societies, in that previously there were only European and American scholars conducting anthropological research in the so-called developing countries. But it actually reflects the changes in times and society as well as the changes in the position of China in the map of world academia. The whole process of us shifting from being an subject of study under close scrutiny to being the ones that examine those who have once studied us, and moving on to establishing a relationship in which both parties would look at each other as equals, is both an embodiment of the policy discourse of “building a community of shared future for mankind” and an inevitable course toward free and fair academic exchanges and dialogues.

Associate Researcher Zhang Jinling from the Institute of European Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) presented his article, titled “State Identity and National Identity in France: Observations and Reflections Based on Daily Life.”

He pointed out that most of the current studies on the topic done in China had been focused on the historical formation of state and national identities in France, the events and concepts that they were based on, and the embodiment of them in the political dimension, but few studies analysed these concepts from the perspective of common people’s daily life experience. “Trying to understand how ordinary French people construct their identity of belonging to a nation and a country would help us truly understand the ideas and values that they advocate,” he said.

Zhang continued that in the framework of many nation-states, the nation is homologous with the state, and this homology is especially prominent in the case of France. The word that denotes the concept of “*nation*,” although spelt the

same in French, carries a strong sense of duality; at the same time, when it is used to refer to the French nation, it also strongly indicates the country composed of it as the main body. There are many words in French that can be used to refer to the concept of “nation,” for example, “*peuple*” means a crowd of people and the nation it makes up, whereas “*nation*” means a nation and the country it makes up. Similarly, a number of words are also used to denote country, such as “*état*,” which is used to refer to a community of people but not a state in its political sense.

The French nation is not a concept of ethnic group, but rather one of a political community, a political construction and a product of a contract. Instead of being established only after the French Revolution, French national consciousness was formed in the early 13<sup>th</sup> century and was further developed during the struggles between the secular forces, represented by the French monarchy, and the Church throughout the 14<sup>th</sup> and 15<sup>th</sup> centuries. France today has evolved from “a product of a contract” into a protector of collective interests that transcend individual interests, and, as a nation, it is an aggregation formed voluntarily and logically by individual citizens who endorse liberty and equality. Despite the homology, “*nation*” in French takes on different meanings when referring respectively to “state” or “nation.” It is only in daily life that the two concepts are combined as one in the word. French anthropologist Ernest Renan argued in 1882 that one fundamental factor that constitutes a nation is the desire of its members to live together. This is at the core of the value orientation toward the construction of a national identity, as well as the core of republican values, and it played a crucial role in the value orientations during French and German mobilization for war in the late 19<sup>th</sup> century. We can summarize the mechanism for French national and state identity with the single word—“republicanism.”

Symbols that represent nation- and state-building are ubiquitous in the everyday life of the French people. For example, identical names of places can be found in all cities and, sometimes, even villages in France, e.g. Rue de la République (the Republic Avenue) and Place Charles de Gaulle (the Charles de Gaulle Square). The former is connected to the particular form of government of France, while the latter is associated with a key political figure of the nation-state. Therefore, when French people see the numerous Republic Avenues, Charles de Gaulle Squares and many other streets named after famous figures in history, they can sense the history behind the name and the strong consciousness and common aspirations the French people have as members of a national community. There are also a great number of public memorials in France, with memorials for World War I making up the largest part of them, as WWI is considered by the French people to be the most historic war and is referred to as “the Great War”, whereas World War II is usually called “the Resistance.” These memorials are often located in the central squares of cities and towns, thereby utilizing the public space and life to remind the French people of the history of their nation-state.

Although France emphasizes the construction of a political community, the ethno-cultural factor was never absent throughout the building of the nation. Historically, the French people were comprised of the Gaul, the Franc and the so-called minorities that were incorporated after being conquered. Cultures from all corners of France gradually blended with one another throughout the long years of existing side by side and eventually formed the core of the French culture. This French culture, although unified as a whole, demonstrates diverse cultural traits, such as romanticism and refinement, which reflect France’s ethno-cultural characteristics.

The construction of culture is another example where space is utilized to remind people of the construction of the

nation-state in the daily lives of French people. For example, an area in Lyon was listed by UNESCO as a World Cultural Heritage site in 1998 due to the fact that it not only witnessed the development of Lyon's weaving industry and of the city itself, but it also hosted many of the important institutions of the contemporary French administrative body. Combining history together with the present, such methods for preserving the city quarters of historical and cultural importance also served to strengthen the national and state identity of the public.

Aside from spaces that can be sensed and felt, there are also a number of intangible symbols marking the national and state identity of France, such as the Marianne, the Tricolour, and the motto *Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité*, which can be seen on all kinds of institutions, documents, and personal credentials. Due to the lack of an official national emblem, the majority of the public regard these images as national emblems, for they include not only the heroine Marianne, who embodies the French nation building, but also the French tricolour and the three-word motto, all of which are linked to the building of the French nation-state.

Other than that, the planning of time as one of the systems of modern state governance also influences the notion of nation-state for French people. The 11 days of public holidays in France are divided into two categories. The first category, secular holidays, comprises many nation-state building related holidays, such as Victory in Europe Day (*Fête de la Victoire 1945*), Armistice Day (*Armistice 1918*), and Bastille Day (*Fête Nationale*); the other is cultural-religious holidays. Given that France's nation-building lays particular emphasis on political community, holidays in the second category, cultural-religious holidays, ostensibly play a weaker role in nation-building, but they still do strongly reflect the ethnic and cultural features of the French nation. Many people no longer view them as religious holidays, but rather cultural holidays, and celebrate



them in a secular way by blending them into their everyday lives.

Zhang Jinling argued that the seemingly well-working republican system of France actually faced several dilemmas. Take ethnic identity and national identity as an example. For a long time, the French nation was mainly made up of local ethnicities within the territory of France and other European ethnicities. After World War II, however, the influx of immigrants of non-European ethnicities significantly increased France's domestic cultural diversity, to the extent that the original republicanism can no longer integrate all these cultures, and no unified aspiration can be found within France for the building of a common political community, regardless of all the ethno-cultural traits. The structure of a single national identity is being progressively challenged by the reality of multiculturalism, a conflict that has become a severe problem for France.

The issues discussed above resulted in a divergence between the national identity and the state identity of France. Initially, the two displayed high level of homology; however, due to the existence of foreign ethnicities, dissimilarities began to grow between them. On the one hand, members of the political community are all citizens of the French Republic from the perspective of the state, but not all of them are necessarily regarded as members of the French nation due to their ethnic characteristics, which in turn gives rise to various kinds of discrimination in real life. On the other hand, French politics pays little attention to the weight of ethnic identity on the micro-level of the society, thus engendering a breach of unity inside France. In a sense, the fact that foreign ethnic groups haven't been recognized as ethnic minorities of France undermines their sense of belonging to the French nation.

Zhang concluded that the republicanism of France is actually facing a crisis, in which whether it has the capability to integrate the multiculturalism of current French society is still

unclear. Despite the initial feature of republicanism as an open structure, a closed identity has been brought about by the development of multiculturalism. The French experience of national and state identity is of great referential value for contemporary Chinese society. Although the two countries have disparate histories, cultures and traditions, and are different in the design of their political systems, Chinese scholars can benefit from studying France through actual experience to understand the process of modern development of human society in the French context.

Postdoctoral researcher Lars Johan Rodin, from Sun Yat-Sen University, presented his research, titled “The Swedish Sámi and the Nation-state’s Conflicting Understandings of Landscape.” He stated that his selection of the topic was influenced by his grandfather, who had concealed his Sámi identity his entire life and only told his grandson before he passed away. Thus, by doing research on the topic, Rodin said he hoped to understand why his grandfather was “ashamed” to admit his identity as a Sámi.

Rodin began his presentation by explaining that the Sámi were an indigenous people whose indigenous lands were currently divided among four nation-states: Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia (the Kola Peninsula). There are several other names for this vast geographical region in northern Europe, such as the North Calotte and the Barents Region, while Sápmi (Sámi land) is the one used by its indigenous habitants, the Sámi. Nowadays, divided by national borders, the Sámi people do not have a unified Sámi language or culture, nor have they even reached an explicit consensus on what constitutes the Sámi identity. On the contrary, their differences have been exacerbated and made more obvious by the division caused by borders. They constantly engage in painful resistance on self-identity issues, but at the same time struggle for a cultural unification across boundaries. Despite all the differences, there

is one commonality between this diverse community of (nationalized) Sámi, and that is the understanding of landscape, especially reindeer grazing land, and especially that of the pastures for reindeer herding. Based on this point, he utilized the concept of “monument” to re-conceptualize the term “landscape” to explain how the Sámi people understand land, which is in sharp contrast to the mainstream perception of land as being only an exploitable resource.

Monuments are usually tangible objects created to commemorate significant events or unified beliefs and to express social identity, and the meanings they carry are usually related to politics. However, for the sake of research purposes and in order to mitigate the tense opposition between the Sámi people and mainstream society, it is necessary to go beyond the frame of nation-state when trying to understand the importance of monuments. In other words, landscapes, when treated as monuments, shouldn't be seen as a certain region in the sense of nature, but should instead be understood in the dimension of society, reality, and life. When landscape is viewed as a space that exists and carries meanings obtained through human life, it becomes a part of the society, the soul, and the memories, actions and changes of the past. It then evolves into a living and breathing space supported by the minds, beliefs and wishes of the people dwelling inside it, existing in both the metaphysical and physical realms of living.

In contrast to the misleading understanding of landscape, the important thing in this milieu is to understand that landscape can have no universal essence. “Place” has often been presented in a too simplified fashion. The intricate nature of “place” has been elucidated by Relph (1976), who spoke of unlimited spatial experiences, such as cerebral, intangible, ideal, that in turn are all experienced at different levels of intensity. This myriad of engagements with place and space does not suggest that they are separated but, rather, are all part of a whole that represents

spatial experiences. In this understanding, they become indivisible—sense is made of the former through inhabiting the latter (places). This, naturally, leads to the notion of identity and place, and a belief that understanding the meaning of a place can only be derived from the depth of knowledge of the feelings of lived intensity that come from those involved.

Coupled with this notion, David Lowenthal traces the historical attitudes toward nature and culture, making the point that in order for the two to be held in terms of their importance, “they had first to be recognised as realms apart from the everyday present.” However, such arguments are usually being made by people with similar backgrounds (habits, skills, dispositions), to the extent that they may be seen in terms of sharing the same habitus, as described by Bourdieu (1977). Lowenthal correctly addresses this, as he contrasts the “mainstream” view of nature, based in Western civilization and its history, with that of some indigenous groups: “nature seems essentially other than us; we may yearn to feel at one with its life-supporting fabric, but, unlike certain aboriginal and tribal peoples, we seldom put ourselves in nature’s place or project ourselves into non-human lives.”

Echoing Lowenthal’s eloquent quote, Rodin argued for an acknowledgement, not a generic acceptance, of such an alternative view of nature, hence Landscape: His use of the term “landscape” and the meaning associated with the term importantly set it aside from other words that may be used, such as “environment.” Landscape has been changed and formed by man (intentionally or unintentionally), in other words there is a “human element” in its association and meaning, which gives the potential for contestation to be introduced. The same landscape may evolve with different meanings, hinging on the different experiences, interests or agendas in question.

In the Sámi context this can be exemplified in their capability (or lack of it) of transmitting cultural contexts of

places through religious association; seen, for example, in how Sámi reindeer herders reference places, something which is nearly impossible through looking at a map. To locate places through reading a map has surely increased, however it also continually fails in expressing (a renewal of) Sámi place-names, and the land features that have a meaning beyond mere minimalistic and capitalistic understanding, such as lived life experiences connected to the place, its historical-cultural meaning for the Sámi and so forth. In other words, map-reading fails to convey toponymic knowledge (a clear example here is reindeer herding, a livelihood that puts paramount importance into such knowledge). Similar issues are obviously found in the antagonism between Sámi reindeer herders and the Swedish state, where traditional graze lands are being capitalized by the state in its expansion of the mining industry.

These disputes of land use between the states (Norway, Sweden, Finland, Russia) and Sámi communities are exacerbated, as is seen from the discussion presented above, and the Sámi who retain their traditional livelihoods and culture are influenced not only politically and financially but also culturally and spiritually by this antagonism. The majority societies determine how the Sámi culture is viewed, preserved and respected, a difficult dilemma as the Sámi and their lands are divided by four nations. Therefore, there is clearly a need for an international approach when accommodating different views on landscape.

The United Nations, for example, has criticized Sweden for its unwillingness to adopt the ILO 169 convention; however, is that a suitable compromise? Its content is lacklustre, at best. Article 14 proposes several empty and moot points in how to see eye-to-eye in disputes between the state and indigenous people. It is likely, furthermore, that these points would probably only be understood from a nation-state perspective, hence it does not provide a viable way forward. Rather, as Rodin proposed in his

conclusion, if rights to the use of land could be negotiated in a usufruct fashion, it would not supersede the nation's generalised notions of wilderness areas, and it would still retain jurisdiction over the lands. At the same time, it would allow for grazingland and for its use to be determined locally.

Associate researcher Ma Qiang, from the Institute of Russian, East European and Central Asian Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, presented on the topic "The Eastern Orthodox Church and the Palace of Culture: The Evolution of Public Places in Russian Villages." He maintained that social transformations are still going on in Russian villages 30 years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In different eras under different social systems, churches and palaces of culture in villages have respectively functioned as cultural spaces, ritual spaces, and carriers of ideology. The rises and declines of these institutions mirrored the transformations and reconstructions of Russian villages over the century and can be used as indicators for the changes in rural society in Russia.

Ma Qiang explained that his fieldwork was conducted in the village of Shishovka, located in the central black earth region in Russia, which has always been an area in Russia where agriculture has been relatively more developed. The tallest building in Shishovka is the St. Nicholas Church, located at the centre of the village with other public buildings and facilities all built around it. There is a square in front of the church, and to the north of the square lie the school, the post office of the village, and the village clinic; to the northwest is the State-run village cooperative. To the east of the church is the village park, and, after the park, one finds the village committee, the local police station, and a local branch of a bank. However, the church was abandoned during most of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, while the executive committee of the local kolkhoz acted instead as the centre of the village.

Before Ma arrived at Shishovka in 2009, two major events took place. The first was the rebuilding of the church, in 2008, and the second was the shutdown of the local palace of culture one year later. This was in stark contradiction to how things used to be in Soviet times: a glorious palace of culture and a dilapidated church. Judging from their appearance, the two public spaces—church and palace of culture—can be seen as respective symbols of the two eras; however, deep down, they represent two different sets of cultural systems that linked together belief, ideology, local rituals, festival celebrations and a series of socio-cultural practices in everyday life. The alternation of these cultural systems and social practices are manifested in the establishment and abandonment of public spaces.

Ma Qiang elaborated that public life in Shishovka revolved around the church. In pre-Soviet times, almost all the farmers in the village were pious Eastern Orthodox Christians, and baptisms, weddings, funerals and other important rituals of life all took place in the church with blessings or requiems delivered by the priest. The Orthodox calendar also included the polytheistic holiday traditions from the old times of the Rus closely related to agricultural activities, so that the seasons and timings of farming were skilfully correlated with the holidays, enabling the calendar to set the pace of farmers' production and life.

In each farmer's house, the brightest place was always dedicated especially for icons of Christ, the Virgin Mary and the Saints for the protection of family members; holy relics would be placed in front of them for the family to worship and pray. The location of the icons was the holiest place in the house, and, according to Russian traditions, major milestones of the family must be celebrated there in the sacred space under the gaze of God.

The comprehensive collectivization in the Soviet Union in the 1930s brought earth-shaking changes to Shishovka and marked a turn in the fate of the village church. In these collectivization movements, the Soviet government started a campaign to eradicate illiteracy, advocate atheism and suppress religious rituals with the goal of forging new “educated” men and women and disseminating socialist ethics, as having religious beliefs was regarded as backward and “uncultured.”

Set off together with the land collectivization movement was an anti-religious campaign hallmarked by the demolition of churches, a fate from which the Shishovka village church was not spared. Along with the demolition of the church came the erection of the palace of culture, which took over as the centre of enlightenment and cultural education and became the public space for forging new Socialist men and women. The palace of culture in Shishovka was built with the intention of enriching the cultural and spiritual life of the local kolkhoz. Informal events and dancing parties, as well as conventions for disseminating propaganda and awarding of commendations, were held there. Yet, although the palace of culture had become a new cultural space in the village, it was not capable of taking up all the roles the church used to play. Even though the palace was equipped with a library and cinema of its own in the hope that book reading and film watching could make the people abandon their old religious beliefs and begin new spiritual lives, it did not realize this goal, as the Eastern Orthodox community swiftly went underground, hidden away from public life.

When it came to the early 1990s, the kolkhozes were dissolved, and the villagers of Shishovka, who had grown accustomed to the collective life, suddenly lost the system upon which they relied. Gone together with the kolkhozes was the collective idea of “everyone is responsible for everyone,” which was reflected in people’s general feeling during the threshold of social transformation that ethics and morals were absent, that the



sole aim of life was the pursuit of money and that the fulfilment of personal desires, collective consciousness and citizen awareness was missing and self-governance and public life in villages was lacking. The Eastern Orthodox religion was then viewed by the people as a source of spiritual comfort; meanwhile, it was seen by the Russian government as a means to unite and mobilize the people.

Consequentially, a wave of Eastern Orthodox revivalism and church rebuilding swept across the country. However, the rebuilding of churches did not equate to the resurrection of belief. The new generation of Russian people that grew up in the wake of secularization were not as religious as the pre-Revolution generations. For them, their orthodox identity was more like a symbol of cultural identity or even national identity. In the meantime, after the dissolution of the kolkhozes, palaces of culture faced tremendous obstacles running and being maintained, and many of them eventually had to be shut down.

Ma Qiang concluded his presentation by pointing out that we could obtain a deeper understanding of the social transformation in Russia with the help of the case of Shishovka. First of all, Russian villages went through two waves of social transformation—collectivization and privatization. Both were reforms taking Western countries' experiences as their models, yet both failed to realize their initial aim. The crucial reason for the failures was that the designers and experimenters of these reforms overlooked important cultural differences. Second, Russia shouldn't really be considered as one of the "Western developed countries" (despite this topic's being included in this workshop.) Recently, it has been more common to consider as a Eurasian country, but, judging from the course of its historical development, the West is only a signpost on Russia's way rather than the final destination of its journey.

Third, renowned contemporary philosopher Sergey Horuzhy commented that the Russian people have the talent for

interacting and creating, and Russian culture is capable of shaping its own cultural logic while being inclusive at the same time. For a long time, Russian studies could be divided into two schools—one trying out existing theories on Russian case studies, the other holding that logic cannot understand Russia, preferring to be agnostic about the subject. As both approaches generate misinterpretations of Russia to a certain degree, researchers should instead try to understand the reality of Russia with Russian cultural logic. And to do so requires a good grasp of Russian thoughts and ideas as well as solid fieldwork.

Doctoral student Krzysztof Kardaszewicz, from the University of Warsaw, studied the Chinese community in Poland. He explained that Chinese are one of the fastest growing and changing foreign communities in Poland. While small in numbers (Chinese with official residence documents number less than 10,000 people), their community offers insight into Poland's process of emerging as a migrant destination country and becoming a part of the evolution of broader migratory patterns among the Chinese diaspora.

It is important to note that, for most of its modern history, Poland itself was country of emigration; and today, with population of 38.5 million people, it has an estimated worldwide diaspora of approximately 20 million people (most of whom live in the US). Experience of migration due to political or economic reasons is written into the lives of successive generations, and the latest example of such mobility is roughly a million Poles undertaking work- and study-related migration to the United Kingdom following Poland's accession to the European Union, in 2004. Over the years of its post-socialist transformation, Poland has mostly served as a migration transit country to Western Europe, and even today, resident foreigners amount to less than 1% of Poland's population. Only recently has the country begun to undergo a gradual transition to a potential

*destination* area, and the history of the Chinese community in Poland is written into this dynamic.

The Chinese diaspora in Poland has developed in three major migratory waves, roughly parallel with the timeline of the Polish post-socialist transformation: the mid-1980s wave, in tandem with Polish economic transition; the 2004 wave, created by Poland's EU membership; and the 2012 wave, which marked a new chapter in China's engagement with the region of Central and Eastern Europe and becoming a new migratory dynamic in the decade following the 2008 world economic crisis. For much of that time, the Chinese presence has been overshadowed by other migrant communities, who were either more established or far larger in numbers. An important example here is the Vietnamese diaspora, which owed its presence in Poland to socialist student exchange programs, followed by a large-scale economic migration taking place after 1989. At its peak, the Vietnamese community was informally estimated to number 50,000 people, active primarily in wholesale trade and the restaurant business, with well-developed community and cultural organizations. While their numbers have since dropped, the influence of Vietnamese on the popular imagination of "Asian" culture in Poland has been profound, and the Chinese community with its business activity and cultural heritage is often understood through and confused with the Vietnamese.

A second example is the Ukrainian diaspora, which since 2014 has grown to become the largest group of foreigners in Poland. Seasonal workers from Ukraine coming to Poland on a circular basis have been increasingly common due to the flexible work permit system introduced in 2006 for six neighboring countries. This trend changed into mass migration following Russia's military intervention in Ukraine and the resulting political and social upheaval. Over the period of 2015 to 2017, between 800,000–1,000,000 seasonal workers from Ukraine came to Poland each year, and many eventually decided to settle.

Today, nearly half of all resident foreigners in Poland (180,000 out of 372,000) are Ukrainian, with a very strong presence in the construction, agriculture and service industries. These two foreign communities are important examples of Poland as an emerging destination country. The Chinese are, at the moment, a smaller example of a very similar process, and the change is illustrated in particular in the differences between the older diaspora and the new.

The older diaspora is an outcome of the first two migration waves (the 1980s and 2004), composed largely of entrepreneurs in search of a new business opportunity. This involved a mixture of students-turned-traders, investors with ties to state-owned-companies, as well as rural Wenzhou economic migrants and “shuttle traders” coming to Poland through Russia and Hungary as part of the “East Europe fever” (东欧热) taking place in China. To most of these migrants, Poland was a new post-socialist market, and often one of several places to do business in the region as they periodically moved between Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary and Italy. With their primary focus on economic gain, their usual migration strategy was to “follow the money,” changing location in pursuit of opportunity rather than settling and adapting to a single place. This was partly emulation of behavior observed among domestic migrants in China, and a number of Chinese communities across Europe followed similar principles of chain economic migration and pursuit of opportunity.

A potent symbol of the time and its migration dynamic was a large disused sports stadium in a central area of Warsaw (Stadion X-lecia), which after 1989 was turned into an outdoor marketplace and which until 2008 served as the largest bazaar in Europe, drawing traders from Central Europe, former Soviet republics, and countries such as Turkey, Vietnam and China. The marketplace was ultimately torn down in preparation for Poland’s hosting of the 2012 Euro Cup championship, and in the

process the Chinese traders began moving their business to a large wholesale complex developed in the mid-1990s on the outskirts of Warsaw, which today is commonly referred to in the community as “Warsaw’s Chinatown.”

The trading diaspora focused around the new Chinatown began to expand significantly as part of the second migration wave, which started in 2004 with Poland’s EU membership and access to the larger European market. Warsaw quickly became a popular logistics and wholesale trade center, allowing for quick business growth and rapid sale of a large volume of goods. In casual estimates, traders recall how they could easily order 30 containers of a single type of product from China (for example, white tennis shoes) and sell it all with little effort. This trading boom began to draw traders from China and other European countries with sizeable Chinese communities, who would set up a new business.

While many of migrants operated and became wealthy in a similar fashion, this rarely translated into greater stability, and the Chinese community as a whole remained transient. Often, as the competition increased and tax control and regulations became strictly enforced, many of traders followed the old strategy and left the country to pursue business elsewhere. In the estimate of established traders like Wang, some 90 percent of the original trading diaspora has by now moved on without coming back. Beyond the “quick profit” rationale, there were several important reasons for their difficulty in establishing a long-term presence.

A key challenge is often posed by a different business style between the Polish and the Chinese. The flexibility and pragmatism which usually underpin Chinese business activity, allowing traders to quickly solve problems and to simply “get things done,” become a double-edged sword in the Polish regulatory environment. The business pace in Poland is often slower, and improvisation takes place in the context of

established regulation and the extensive, rigid bureaucracy. Chinese traders often complain of clashing with Polish institutions and of “harassment” by tax and customs authorities, which interferes with business.

In addition, many years of focus on quick profits meant that only a few of the most resourceful Chinese businesspeople are now able to develop a larger business strategy, such as development of brand products for exports to China. While, for example, one businesswoman has built a new company based on a range of regional amber-branded products (from jewelry, to beer, to cosmetics), the majority of Chinese entrepreneurs only engaged in a fierce competition of illegal amber extraction and export for sale to China.

The questionable or sometimes illegal business practices focused on instant profits often contribute to existing cultural and social misunderstandings between the trade diaspora and the mainstream Polish society. The Chinese trade community is perceived as “isolated” and “closed to outsiders,” which frequently gives rise to misconceptions about China (sometimes associated with Vietnam) and to distrust of “wealthy foreigners.”

However, an important change in all of the above issues and in the profile of the community has been taking place over the last six years. Starting in 2012, China’s diplomatic and economic engagement with Poland took on a new dynamic, with high-level bilateral state visits, inauguration of the “16+1 initiative” in Warsaw, and the opening of two Chinese state-bank offices. Poland has since received increased attention as part of the One Belt One Road initiative, which translated into a rise in visiting delegations, tourism and in immigration from China. The third migration wave, which began at the time, was very different from the existing trade diaspora. It was composed largely of middle-class white-collar professionals, university students, and families looking for suitable schools and

a safe environment for their children. For them, Poland was not a place to seek business opportunities or wealth, but a stable country with a growing economy and healthy environment, which, while being an EU member, offers a lower cost of living. Many of the new arrivals were motivated by search for a better quality of life.

While the change is significant, it is still unclear whether it will translate into a long-term trend with a larger, settled Chinese population. Although frequently better educated and affluent, the new arrivals continue to face some of the enduring challenges that affect long-term prospects of Chinese diaspora in Poland as a whole. A language barrier and struggle to build-up deeper local relationships contributes to ongoing social and cultural isolation, which proves hard to overcome. Unsure how to deal with local institutions—from healthcare, to schooling and taxes—new arrivals often have to rely on translation, uncertain information and private sector services. Finally, as new regulations introduce stricter requirements concerning application for a three-year residence visa—by far the most popular means of securing residence among new Chinese arrivals—many of the families who say they are prepared to purchase real-estate and remain in Poland long-term are now uncertain whether they will be able to stay. As the Chinese diaspora is evolving under the presence of new arrivals, it remains to be seen whether Poland will become more than just a transition country, which it often served as until the present.

Shang Wenpeng, lecturer at the College of Foreign Studies at Jinan University, conducted his fieldwork on homeschooling in the Boston Area. His research was one that took individual families as its object and presented the educational practices of active individuals by telling a series of life stories. It reflected on topics such as discipline and counter-discipline and a society that values individualism.

Since the legalization of homeschooling, in 1993, the number of homeschooled children in the US has increased rapidly, reaching 2.3 million in the year 2016, and making up 4 percent of the school-age population in the US.

Families that homeschool their children are very diverse; they come from different geographic regions, and have different ethnic and racial backgrounds and different religious beliefs. These disparities enlarge as time goes by. Generally speaking, parents of these families possess higher educational qualifications and earn salaries that are typical of the middle class in the US.

Shang Wenpeng conducted his fieldwork in the Greater Boston area in the US state of Massachusetts with participants who resided in cities, described themselves as politically left-wing, and chose to homeschool their children not out of religious reasons. These criteria for selecting participants were chosen because homeschooling is more often seen in rural families in the South or Midwest of the US and mostly for religious reasons, whereas the Boston area, where the number of homeschooling families doubled in the past 10 years, has a very high educational level. This striking statistical increase is worthy of an in-depth study.

One mother who chose homeschooling for her children expressed her belief that “schools are like hospitals; you only go there when you’re ill. If one day I send my children to school, it must be that I am not able to teach them anymore.” This view was shared among many parents who had made the same choice. For them, homeschooling was an especially attractive method of education and lifestyle, and by no means a substitute for school education, even after escaping from it. Others stressed the importance of their educational mission. For example, they would like their children to establish their own values by learning from them, instead of being influenced by school. This is because public opinion in the US regards parents and family



as authoritative in the character education of children throughout the process of their socialization. This moral consensus supports many families in choosing homeschooling.

The struggle between the two ways and locations for transmitting culture—family and school—over which is more capable of cultivating independence in individuals has never ceased since the beginning. With the development of modernity, however, parents have been losing ground to schools in the field of education, which have gradually prevailed over family and become the dominant type of education in modern society.

Despite that, the conflict between the two educational approaches has intensified since the 1990s against the background of the rise of the second modernity characterised by the freedom of choice, and the number of families who choose to homeschool their children have been witnessing a steady rise.

Another important motive reported by a great majority of families for choosing homeschooling is discontent with public schools. According to Foucault, school is a disciplinary institution that produces docile bodies by applying a series of disciplinary techniques and observation. Aside from that, some of the parents also complain about the content and method of the subjects taught in schools. Although approving of public education, they hope their children will learn genuine history instead of distorted history at school.

Actually, reforms in public education are constantly being carried out in the US, with the Federal government getting involved deeper in education sectors that should be in the hands of local governments and requiring the implementation of more standardised tests.

These measures have caused much controversy; teachers panic as a great part of the content of courses must be redesigned to accommodate the exams, while parents criticize these standardization measures for suppressing children's

creativity and stupefying them. Private schools, in the meantime, have their problems too. On the one hand, these schools are dominated by exclusive elitism; on the other hand, their fees can cause substantial economic pressure on students' families. "Homeschooling" in its essence can be understood as a practice of cultural citizenship started by the parents, who, sceptical of standardized national education, challenge the conventional ways of cultivating citizenship in schools and actively construct their own frame of understanding on issues, including education, the state, and citizenship.

These parents do not agree with the term "home school" but rather refer to it as "city school," as they utilize the public educational resources of the city to their full extent and emphasize the social advantages of homeschooling, such as not being restricted within walls or limited by rigid time and space arrangements. They can flexibly choose the resources that fit them as active individuals, and this has proved more efficient, judging from the results. On the other hand, however, sending children to various institutions preparatory to entering university is not fundamentally different from the middleclass treating children as educational projects. As social beings, it is difficult for them to hold expectations of their children's future development that really break away from middleclass values, and their understanding of the significance of social life and personal value is always dependent on their socioeconomic status.

In conclusion, according to Foucault, the "home to school" process is the application of discipline as a technology of control. However, the "school back to home" process is not one of anti-discipline. In the US, it might be considered a sublimation of the modern state/market system, in which the disciplinary mechanism has been internalized.

Associate professor Liu Qian, from Renmin University's Institute of Anthropology, also focused on education in the US

in her fieldwork. She presented her fieldwork research, which she undertook during the 2013–14 academic year, situated in a public school in a poor neighbourhood in central Philadelphia. She talked about her observations and reflections on the examinations in the school.

Liu’s fieldwork location was set in Andrew Jackson School in central Philadelphia. It is located in the school district of Philadelphia which ranks as the 8<sup>th</sup> largest in the country by enrolment, serving 130 thousand students as of 2014. Half of the schools the district operates are “charter schools” that receive public funding but operate independently, with the headmaster in charge of daily operation. These schools are exempt from a variety of regulations affecting other public schools, thus free from some of the difficulties public schools face. Andrew Jackson School had 449 students in grades kindergarten through 8, of whom Hispanic students accounted for the largest percent at about 35 percent, followed by African Americans, non-Hispanic whites, Asians, and other ethnic groups. In the 2013–14 rating of the public schools in the school district of Philadelphia, Andrew Jackson School got 1.5 stars out of 5, while at least 80 out of the 200-plus schools rated got 1 star. Therefore, Andrew Jackson School is quite typical in its school district.

The examinations in Andrew Jackson School can be described as solemn but relaxed. First of all, there is the unified examination, administered in all schools in the state of Pennsylvania to assess students’ academic performance, as well as the schools’ performance in helping students meet academic standards. Each year, every Pennsylvania student in grades 3 through 8 and grade 11 is assessed in maths and reading. Every Pennsylvania student in grades 5, 8 and 11 is assessed in writing. Every Pennsylvania student in grades 4 and 8 is assessed in science. All examination results are recorded in the students’ academic record.

Before the exam, all items in the exam rooms that have words on them must be covered. Each examination booklet is designated for a particular student and has its unique barcode. The proctor reads out exam disciplinary regulations and asks the students to sign, indicating their understanding of them before the exam starts. During the exam, the proctor cannot say anything, or else the school may be viewed as cheating by the inspector from the school district. During the exam, students are allowed to chew gum and blow their nose. Some of the questions even allow the use of calculators. Most importantly, the exams have no time limit. Students who have not completed their papers in the designated time are transferred into other exam rooms, so that they can continue working on their exams until they finish. Other than that, students are not allowed to discuss the exam questions afterward, because the exams are designed and their copyright owned by the examination company that has been contracted by the school district.

Regular exams are also solemn and relaxed. The usual quizzes in Andrew Jackson School are designed by the teachers themselves, who would delete some of the answer choices in quizzes for children who have special language support or educational needs. Besides that, there are no mid-term or final exams, nor are there any time limits for quizzes. The evaluation is strict in the sense that all the grades that students receive for either written exams or handcraft projects are logged into the student record system, which will then be kept throughout the students' lifetime.

The rigour and laxness of the above-mentioned examination method can be found in different aspects of social time. Rigour is shown in the examination's rhythm of time, manifested in the precise monitoring rhythm and procedures; in its value of time, shown in the accurate calculation and division based on time; in the tacit agreement on it, evident in the three aspects of inspection carried out during exam period. Laxness can be seen

in the time theme of the exams, as in the individualized time allowed for finishing the exam; in the tacit agreement such as allowed usual behaviours during exams and the relaxation afterward; in the value of time, seen in the teaching activities that are not related to exam frequency.

Liu Qian argues that the approach of analysing using the framework of social time is because all practical activities are based on certain sense of time. There is a consensus that different communities have different rhythms and sense of time, as well as different behavioural patterns in a certain time period. Therefore, social time as a framework is capable of analysing different societies' operation patterns and the ideologies they embody.

How to assess academic performance through examination has always been a difficult issue and thinking about it involves answering questions such as how should we consider people and knowledge, and how to measure the relationship between these two. The response to these questions in a certain society reflects that society's perception and helps us understand its material support and institutions. As we can see, Andrew Jackson School's examination system pays attention to differences between individuals, and lays emphasis on their empirical existence. In this view, knowledge becomes a method or tool used by humans, an idea that is most fundamental to American utilitarianism. Knowledge is not the worship of texts, and children are not inheritors blessed by our ancestors, but rather experiencers and practitioners who must obtain knowledge from books by personal experience. Whether education should be directed toward passing an examination or serve as a container that includes examination, merits further discussion. How to nurture the younger generation is a question every country and nation deliberates on, and the different answers to it show different understandings of humankind and of humanity.

Liang Wenjing, lecturer from Chongqing University's Institute of Advanced Studies in Humanities and Social Science, presented her research, titled "The Moral Economy of the US Charitable Organizations: A Case Study of Habitat for Humanity in Middletown." Moral economy's basic stance is opposition to chasing pure profit in the market economy. She argues that, by studying the case of Habitat for Humanity in Middletown, we can find that although the moral economy of charitable organizations stands in opposition to market economy, it is essentially part of the market economy.

Habitat for Humanity is a charitable organization in the US that aims to help low- and middle-income people access housing. By the end of 2015, Habitat for Humanity had established more than 1,500 local offices all over the US and was running projects in more than 90 countries in the world. Liang's fieldwork location, Middletown, is located in the Midwestern US and is the place where American sociologists Robert Lynd and Helen Lynd conducted their famous Middletown studies. The idea for Habitat for Humanity, founded by Millard and Linda Fuller, originally came from communal farms. Millard Fuller became a millionaire by age 30, after which he lost his taste for pursuing money and profit and found himself facing a series of problems. After self-reflection, he chose to give up the life of a millionaire and join a farming community, from which he developed the idea of Habitat for Humanity.

The concept of moral economy was initially an elaboration by English historian E.P. Thompson. Its basic standpoint is "counter-capitalism," i.e., it stands against the chase of pure profit in the market economy. Later, the concept changed to include the idea of reciprocity, stressing, especially, donations by middle- and higher-income classes. In line with the basic stance of Thompson's moral economy, Habitat for Humanity in Middletown is against capitalism. Moreover, a large part of Habitat for Humanity's funding needed for its operation is from

entrepreneurs' donations. However, different from Thompson's moral economy of popular "riot" in which the main actor is low-class citizens, Habitat for Humanity shows the active shouldering of responsibility by the middle- and higher-income classes.

Millard Fuller proposed an "economics of Jesus" in 1980, deriving from the story of Jesus Christ feeding a multitude using five loaves and two fishes. This is manifested in Habitat for Humanity in the following aspects: first of all, the organization does not profit from building any house, and the homeowner purchases the home with a 0% interest mortgage. Second, the money that Habitat for Humanity uses to build homes is funded by the local Fund for Humanity from funds accumulated from donations, mortgage payments, and proceeds from affiliated stores. Third, due to the large wealth gap in the world, the rich have the obligation to share their wealth with the poor. Fourth, people's need is of utmost importance, and people's usefulness or the productivity is irrelevant to meeting their needs. Kindness and love should be equally available to everyone.

The Middletown Habitat for Humanity often emphasizes that the mortgages they offer to partner families are interest free, which is one of the basic philosophies of Habitat for Humanity. It is based on the Bible verse: "If thou lend money to any of my people that is poor by thee, thou shalt not be to him as an usurer, neither shalt thou lay upon him usury" (Exodus 22:25). No interest mortgages provide Habitat for Humanity with recyclable capital to provide services to more families. Partner families, on the other hand, earn homes by themselves and contribute to other people's homes, which is a decent and dignified deed.

A huge chunk of the money used to build houses for partner families by Middletown Habitat for Humanity comes from entrepreneurs who contribute to charitable organizations as their moral economic practice. Aside from money, some enterprises provide goodwill donations, including services and appliances.

For example, almost every house built by Habitat for Humanity receives donations from well-known American companies such as Whirlpool, Dow, and Valspar. Some entrepreneurs may even donate to the organization as individuals. They highly value this kind of donation because it can help those homebuyers who cannot receive bank loans through normal channels. Middletown Habitat for Humanity operates as a charitable organization by applying a number of approaches used by for-profit organisations, which also makes its moral economy different from Thompson's moral economy in the context of a "popular food riot." The difference can mainly be seen in the following aspects: First, although Habitat for Humanity does not profit overall, it does have revenue and expenditure. A large part of its revenue comes from second-hand stores, whereas expenditure covers salaries for staff and costs of fundraising activities. Second, the organization hires. For a while, after its establishment in 1986, all members of the 12 working committees under the organization's board of directors were volunteers—from organisers to builders. Since Habitat for Humanity started to employ staff, only four committees have been kept – administration, finance, partner selection, and green construction. Relevant services got more professional, and the speed of home construction rose. Third, the organization follows certain norms of the market economy. Every year on average, Middletown Habitat for Humanity sells two partner families' debt to the bank in return for cash the amount of which equates to about 80 percent of the original debt. Middletown Habitat for Humanity recognises the bank's right to fee deduction, because although it only receives \$42500 for the \$50000 that will only be fully paid after 20 years, the funds are readily available and can be used for home construction right away.

Middletown Habitat for Humanity also applies some of the procedures used by banks. For example, they require candidate partner families to provide proof of their ability to repay. In



terms of propaganda, they also use a number of methods in the business sector, such as mailing out annual reports, invitations to home handover ceremonies, holiday greetings, and donation cards, in order to attract more support.

Liang Wenjing pointed out in his conclusion that the case of Middletown Habitat for Humanity shows that charitable organizations' moral economy stands in opposition to the pursuit of pure profit in the market economy and emphasizes donations. Different from the moral economy of E.P. Thompson, which came from the lower class, the charitable organization's moral economy was started mainly by members of the middle- and higher-income classes, capable of meeting some people's need, and is an important supplement to the market economy. This encourages citizens—including enterprises—to actively engage in public charity. Moreover, it accepts and applies a number of operating approaches in the market economy. It is hoped that this study may inspire Chinese charitable organizations and facilitate the Chinese public's understanding of them.

Wang Liyang, lecturer at East China University's Institute of Folklore, focused on US middle-class families. He maintained that the middle class, regarded as the symbol of modern society and cornerstone of social stability, has been on the decline and hollowing out in the US for the past several decades. This has been the source of anxiety in the US society, and remained as one of the main focuses of American political debate in the last decade. Wang Liyang's fieldwork aims to present the fragility of the middle class from a micro perspective of cultural practices. By studying the hospice care experience of a middle-class family in Middletown, Indiana, he shows how the life crisis of a family member can cause economic and mental/psychological stress for, and even reduce the social standing of, the family.

The research is an ethnographical study of the life ceremonies of Middletown residents. Life ceremonies are those performed at crucial moments in life, such as birth, marriage, pregnancy, and death. These ceremonies are not only significant in the individual's lifecycle, but also vital for maintaining order and passing down values in the society.

Middletown is located in northeast Indiana, US, and was considered by Robert and Helen Lynd as having the typical climate, culture, economy, geographic location and population of an American town. Town life plays an essential role in America's political and social life. Tocqueville once commented that town life is where US politics is derived from and where citizens grow up. The state of Indiana, where Middletown lies, has long been considered a Republican stronghold, with the incumbent US Vice President Mike Pence having been one of its former governors. The political stance of Middletown, however, has been inconsistent in that it has voted successively for George W. Bush, then Barack Obama, and then for Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders in the 2016 presidential elections. The industry of Middletown has declined, leaving only a few small factories. The town's distinctly demarcated residential layout preserves the characteristics of the 1920s, with the working class, African Americans, and the elite class living in different quarters. Wang Liyang explained that the participant family in his fieldwork belonged to the local middle class and was politically conservative, supporting the Republican party and calling Obama a socialist. In the second half of his fieldwork, the family was struck by a life crisis, which was unexpected but provided Wang with an invaluable chance of studying that family's life ceremonies. Life ceremony studies are extremely hard to conduct in depth. Currently, many of these studies focus on an ideal of a ceremony, whereas real life studies of life ceremonies need to enter the depth of the private domain.

Therefore, the event offered a rare chance for Wang to gain insight into life ceremonies.

The problem of the middle class is actually a particularly pertinent one in the US now. In 2015, the American Pew Research Center published a report on the population and income changes of all classes in the US. Statistics showed that, while the middle class made up 70% of the population in the US in 1971, the percentage dropped to 50% in 2015. The percentage of a middle class family's income in the overall family income in the US also dropped from 62% to 43%. The middle class has started to shrink while the wealth gap has kept widening, which has contributed to middle-class anxiety about society. Although the anxiety caused by the decline of the new middle class is hardly perceivable in everyday life, it becomes suddenly obvious when life crises strike individuals, as well as the social anti-structure and subverting factors manifested in the crisis.

The life crisis in the participant family started after Thanksgiving 2013, when the wife's father's health condition worsened. The couple disagreed on the arrangement for taking care of the elderly, and they decided to have both parents move to live with them. However, in early 2014, shortly after the wife's parents had moved in, her mother, who had had heart and lung diseases previously, relapsed. Diagnosis showed that she couldn't be cured, and so the hospital suggested hospice care, which meant the termination and replacement of active treatment with palliative care only in order to protect the patient from extra pain. Due to hospice care's popularity and the family's Christian beliefs, they took the hospital's advice and started to prepare for it mentally and materially.

Unexpectedly, hospice care had grave repercussions for the family. First of all, tied up with looking after the patient and the family, the couple had to put off half of their company's business, thus affecting the family's financial situation. Moreover, although the family applied for volunteer services for

hospice service from relevant institutions, they still shouldered most of the mental burden on their own due to their limited resources. The wife's mother passed away in April 2014, but this was not the end of the crisis for the family. In 2018, the wife posted an article on Facebook in which she reviewed the entire process of the crisis, talked about the subsequent loss of their house and moving into a place that had problems everywhere, and the resultant decline in their family's class and social standing.

Wang Liyang pointed out that, although this is only a story of a small family, individual experiences of this kind serve as opportunities for social reflection and point out areas needing reform. It is especially so during life crises, in which the experiences reveal the inequities in life circumstances, which are usually hidden away by the culture. Generally speaking, the middle class is anxious and uncertain about education, disease, and death, but these are often pictured as personal failures by the society. Systemic problems exist behind this phenomenon. As C. Wright Mills argues, behind anxiety lies the slow deprivation of resources, the spectre of unemployment, and the persistent crisis of the middle class.

Professor Gao Bingzhong, from Peking University's Department of Sociology, said in his concluding remarks that the primary challenge faced by European and American social studies in China is that, people in these European and American countries perceive the state in vastly different ways than do members of the Chinese academia. For example, the Sámi people's challenge to the state as well as the cases of Russia, France, and Poland discussed today all show that there can be huge differences and tension within a country. Nowadays, we do fieldwork and ethnography with the aim of observing the relationship between the individual and the country within the concept of world society. This relationship is not a homologous and inseparable one; a country is a community that we belong to,

but not the only one. Countries in Europe and America have already passed through the stage where they were highly unified. Now they face increasing domestic heterogeneity, but they view diversity and heterogeneity as positive factors rather than limit or strangle them. The presentations today provided insights into people, society, government, and country, and their definitions, and contributed to the general concepts and basic understanding of anthropological and ethnographic studies.

The most crucial part of fieldwork is the selection of research objects. Compared to other disciplines, anthropological fieldwork's object selection is subject to more professional rules, but it also accommodates larger individual diversity. Anthropology's fundamental contribution and disciplinary capability is that everyone can produce their own objects, in that everyone can create their unique objects through their personal approach, created from their unique life and study experience. In the meanwhile, the production of objects is always accompanied by innovative and pioneering works, and innovation in ethnographic approach is the eternal aim of anthropology. Everyone in their presentation today discussed methodology in one way or another, because innovation and pioneering must be correctly and reasonably guided. Even if the content of the presentation might not have attracted attention or been of great influence, its elaboration on the legitimacy and reasonability of its innovation will contribute to the community of anthropological knowledge and inspire those who come after us, by sharing innovative and pioneering methods.