

The Fourth Broadyard Workshop
Challenges and Options Facing Europe

April 12, 2018

The Fourth Broadyard Workshop, with the theme “Challenges and Options facing Europe,” was hosted by Prof. Li Qiang of the School of Government at Peking University, and Researcher Feng Zhongping, director of the Institute of European Studies at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, who delivered keynote speeches. In addition, Prof. Dong Qiang, Prof. Qian Chengdan, Prof. Shen Jian, Prof. Kong Tianping and Prof. LianYuru gave important presentations.

The subject of Prof. Dong Qiang’s presentation was “Talks on Cultural Choices in Contemporary Europe.”He made a distinction between two types of domestic experts in area studies. The first type is foreign language experts, mainly majoring in foreign languages in departments of foreign languages and belonging to the disciplines of linguistics or literature. The other type is academics in sociology, international politics studies, international relations, history and so on. In light of the relative independence between these two types of scholars and between fields they major in, he expects that research combining language studies, humanities and social sciences could break down barriers and balance each other. The Institute of Area

Studies, Peking University (PKUIAS) is a platform for this.

Prof. Dong introduced the origins of the name of the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences in France where he worked. He points out that this institute is supposed to be a French Academy of Humanities and Social Sciences. Yet why is it called the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences? It is because it was founded in the end of 18th century, a time when there were no names for the humanities and social sciences. However, at that time, due to the thoughts of enlightenment thinkers, especially Montesquieu and Rousseau, French people realized that there had been some unprecedented phenomena occurring in the history of human civilization, which could not be confronted and explained by existing disciplines. These phenomena could not be classified into natural sciences, art or literature. People believed the most fundamental thing holding humans together was ethics, morality and customs. In the French language, the word for “custom” shares the same root as “morality.” The concept dealing with the operation of society is politics. For this reason, the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences emerged. This institution has produced some of the most significant figures in Europe, who are closely related to the theme of today’s seminar.

Prof. Dong recounted predictions from two politicians about the future in China. One of them is Jacques Chirac, the former president of France, and the other one is Alain Peyrefitte.

In 2005, President Chirac announced in a farewell address that China is soon going to be one of the most important countries or even the most important one in the world, and thus there is a great need to include China while considering any issue in the world. At that moment, China hadn't yet hosted the Olympic Games, and Chirac didn't have to flatter anyone since his tenure was almost due. Alain Peyrefitte was a French scholar and politician. He had met Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong in China. He once wrote a book named *Quand la Chine s'éveillera, le monde tremblera* (*When China wakes up, the world will shake*) informed by his travel experiences in China during the Cultural Revolution. That book became a bestseller in France in 1980s and shook the world. From today's perspective, the book showed great sensitivity and insight about China. Prof. Dong said that the reason why these two politicians were more accurate in their predictions than many sinologists and Chinese people was that they analyzed China not only from a political perspective, but also based on their affection and knowledge of China. Chirac was very fond of Chinese ancient culture and fascinated with bronzeware, Chinese philosophy, ancient Chinese poetry, Chinese calligraphy and so on. Alain Peyrefitte was an anthropologist from CNRS (Centre national de la recherche scientifique). Therefore, it is not because of their great political wisdom that they anticipated contemporary China properly. They had political wisdom, but their predictions were

not based on this. Rather, their predictions should be attributed to their instincts and enthusiasm for China.

The former prime minister of France, Jean-Pierre Raffarin, made a similar judgement, saying that a country and nation like China should have the voice and status that it deserves in the contemporary world, since it has historically produced such wonderful ideologies, civilization and culture.

Based on the observations above, Prof. Dong hopes that PKUIAS can base its work on studies of the fundamental nature of a country or a nation, especially focusing on true knowledge, rather than on overly practical think-tank topics. It has been proved that there is no practical point in making predictions about who will be in power, who will be the president, and so on. First of all, this kind of prediction will not be necessarily accepted by decision-making groups, who are not able to take timely actions even if they recognize those forecasts. This is because there is one certainty in international politics and international relations, which is that nothing is forever, but rather new relations as well as new problems always arise in bilateral interactions and competition. The current US-China issues and China-DPRK issues are the best examples of this. There is still something relatively constant existing in a country or a region. For example, in Japan, books like *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword* can always help us to understand this nation, no matter how times change.

As for the cultural choices of Europe, he said that the key point of this idea is that Europe is not a geographical concept but a universal and broad cultural one. We live in an era that is becoming more and more open, which is of significance for all countries, especially for Europe.

This tendency has a cruel history. For nearly two centuries, Europe has been pursuing policies of forced globalization, from the discovery of America to colonization. Particularly in the end of 19th century, the glorious age of France was built on the prosperity of its colonies, from which new raw materials and workers opened up entirely new possibilities for France. The great success of the Industrial Revolution brought a tremendous boom and development for France, Germany and Britain. This escalated conflicts between Germany and France and ultimately led to a world war. Fundamentally, the initial emergence of the EU is the result of Europe's awareness of the danger of conflicts between Germany and France. Leaders of different countries made many efforts to eliminate potential conflicts between Germany and France and promote the formation of a European camp. Milan Kundera, a well-known author who escaped from Czechoslovakia to France in 1985, delivered a famous speech while collecting a literature prize in Jerusalem. He mentioned that Israel is the heart of Europe, a heart outside the matrix, as the experiences of Jewry represent Europe's international spirit. In other words, there are few European countries considering

themselves as self-sufficient and closed. They all realize the necessities of going abroad to communicate with neighboring countries at any time. The phrase “teeth cannot live without lips” from *The Commentary of Zuo* (one of the earliest Chinese works of narrative history) is quite appropriate for situations in European countries.

In France, the way President Emmanuel Macron has acted after taking power greatly embodies the interdependence among European countries. His efforts to find some fresh cohesion for Europe are very evident. On April 9, 2018, a day of the conference of bishops, Macron announced in defiance of world opinion that it is necessary to repair damaged relations between churches and the governments, which is obviously a pursuit of common culture in Europe, especially with the increasing influence of Islamic forces. As we can see from his addresses at Sorbonne University and the book fair in Frankfurt, a cultural vision shared with Europe in the 17th or 18th century is forming in the mind of this young president. Fundamentally speaking, European culture is kind of international and outward-facing culture. We cannot be stuck within European nations’ domestic borders while studying the European issue. Rather, we must investigate its extension, or sphere of influence, or at least a kind of psychological scope based on modern traditions.

Prof. Dong concluded that the international posture in Europe prevents populism and isolationism from entirely

prevailing. Of course, due to the problems of terrorism and refugees, each country will take some measures to strengthen self-protection. However, it is very difficult to imagine that Europe will return to a state of self-isolation or beggar-thy-neighbor policies. With the contemporary world full of uncertainty, there is only one choice for Europe, which is to obtain the strength and ability to contend with China and the US through the EU's domestic opening-up. In the meantime, Europe attracts visitors around the world by virtue of its strong international culture and unique cultural heritage. Europe can depend on this history to continue pursuing the global dreams of Europe that have existed since the Renaissance.

Prof. Feng Zhongping gave a presentation entitled "Challenges and Prospects facing European Integration." He stated that there are several perspectives of European studies, such as perspectives of geography, religion, international relations, regional integration and so on. He analyzed current issues in Europe and its direction of future development from the perspective of European integration after World War II.

Prof. Feng focused on two critical times. The first was 1945, at the conclusion of World War II. The war deprived Europe of its leading position as the center of the world, with many people predicting that the region would probably never rise again because of the devastation of the two world wars. However, the truth is that Europe found, or was forced to find, a way to build

an international coalition after reflecting on its painful experiences. This created a new situation for international relations around the world, and Europe entered a new era.

The second critical time was after the Cold War. The end of the Cold War ended the division between East and West Europe, and the EU became a synonym of Europe, after which came the golden age of European integration, with the EU and NATO expanding eastward simultaneously. The quantity of EU members increased gradually. There were only 6 member states at the beginning of European integration, which increased to 12 before the fall of Berlin Wall, and to 28 after the Cold War. Europe also unified its currency. This was an unprecedented feat in the history of global international relations.

Prof. Feng said that Europe has changed a lot since 1945. Integration changed Europe, reversing its post-war decline and turning it into the world's largest market, most important economy and the international actor with the strongest soft power.

Prof. Feng analyzed the current challenges facing Europe. He claimed that European integration faces unprecedented challenges after experiencing advances for 60 or 70 years. He summarized three challenges that face the development of Europe.

First, forces of Euroscepticism and opposition to the EU are rising. Two decades ago, most countries embraced European

integration, except a few countries like the UK and Denmark. Now that the world has moved on, the forces of Euroscepticism and anti-European integration are driven by three forces. One of them is the defeat of the 2007 referendum on the EU constitution, which showed the rise of Euroscepticism. Second, the financial crisis, the European debt crisis, the refugee crisis and terrorist attacks that occurred in the following decade raised discontent in Europe. Third, this discontent was utilized by ultra-nationalist politicians, organizations and parties, who claimed they could resolve European issues by opposing immigration, globalization and European integration. This force has two sides, the ultra-left and ultra-right, both of which are powerful. The British and the Europeans have never been of the same mind. Populism is the final straw that broke the camel's back. It is a reason for the success of Brexit in 2016. In addition, the rise of populist parties in French and German elections is also alarming. In other words, Euroscepticism and opposition to European integration are no longer individual phenomena for individual European countries. Populist parties that used to be marginal have now risen up, entering parliaments and governments and posing challenges to European integration.

Second, the conflicts within Europe have intensified. There are internal conflicts between the north and the south as well as the east and the west, among which "the east and the west" refers mainly to old Europe and new Europe, that is, Western

Europe and Central and Eastern Europe. In terms of issues on migration and refugees, Central and Eastern European countries refuse to accept refugees, with Western European countries bearing the primary burden. “The south and the north” refers to Nordic countries and southern European countries respectively. During the European debt crisis, Greece and other countries expected that the Nordic countries would lend a helping hand. However, the increase in conflicts in the past decade has weakened the cohesion of Europe.

Third, the external environment of European integration has changed, which is mainly reflected in three aspects. First, the original intention of integration after World War II was to eliminate wars, build peace and carry forward reconciliation between member countries, especially between France and Germany. It is now inconceivable that wars would happen between European countries, thus the momentum of integration has weakened. Another intention of European integration was to combine forces against the Soviet Union. Yet the threat of Russia nowadays cannot be compared with the threat during the Cold War, though Russia’s neighboring European countries such as those around the Baltic Sea still remain concerned.

The support of the US for European integration has changed greatly after Trump took power. It is a heavy blow to Europe that president of the US supports Brexit and a breakup of the EU.

Prof. Feng anticipated the future direction of the EU's development. First of all, he put forward a general judgement that the EU would not suddenly break up or collapse like the Soviet Union, even though there are many uncertainties in its prospects. He says that we should consider Europe's prospective development from the following perspectives.

First, the forces of populism, which are anti-European integration and anti-establishment forces, will play a role in Europe for a long time, but they won't become the political power dominating Europe.

Second, Macron's election has greatly reversed populism's threat to Europe, but a series of measures and projects to promote European integration that he proposed after taking power may not succeed. It is difficult to forecast how far Macron's reforms in France will go, with frequent strikes springing up. On the other hand, although the socialist party in the current coalition government is pro-Europe, the power structure of the German parliament has changed. Therefore, it is hard to predict how much of a role Germany and France can play in promoting the integration of Europe in the future.

Prof. Feng offered his own opinions about the future of European integration. He said that from the first day, integration has been advancing synchronously and at the same speed, which created many of the problems at present. There can be a new approach in the future, namely a dual-speed or multi-speed

Europe, which means several integration tracks can co-exist among the current 27 countries in the EU, involving both fast and slow ones. The one Macron promotes is probably a fast lane, which other countries may not necessarily catch up with. The common ground for all will be a shared security and defense policy. Thus, there are more possibilities in the integration project with this kind of approach.

Prof. Qian Chengdan delivered a speech entitled “What does the Catalonia Referendum suggest?” Prof. Qian analyzed the implications of Catalonia’s independence referendum and its result in 2017. He said that it is the will and authorization of the people to determine Catalonia’s prospects through the referendum. But he asked why independence can’t be implemented when most voters agree on Catalonia’s separation from Spain, as shown in the result of the referendum. The reason is that the EU, the UK, the US, Germany, France and some other countries all announced in public their non-recognition and lack of support for the result. In contrast, it seems to have become politically correct that national self-determination authorized by the people is supported by international society after the Cold War. So why do these countries object to the independence of Catalonia? Their reasoning is the protection of Spain’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, which brings about two problems.

The first problem is that one basic principle of the United

Nations is to preserve each country's territorial integrity and sovereignty. However, people in the West all cheered when the former Soviet Union broke up thirty years ago. There were institutional and other causes for its collapse. The Soviet Union was made up of 15 republics, whose administrative zones were divided fundamentally by ethnic residential areas and settlements. The excuse for these republics to break away from the Soviet Union when it collapsed was to pursue national self-determination. After the formation of the Russian Federation, its original political composition still took ethnic residential areas as a basic framework. Thus, it is possible that the Russian Federation could breakup if national self-determination was utilized as a rallying point. Russia soon became aware of this problem, especially after Putin took power. He changed the method of dividing the country into simple geographical boundaries, thus breaking barriers based on ethnicity. After this move, it is unlikely that ethnic division would propel the dissolution of the Russian Federation.

The second problem is the Kosovo incident. When Yugoslavia collapsed, Kosovo demanded independence from Serbia. Serbia was faced with the danger of dissolution, leading to a war between independence and anti-independence forces. Kosovo is just a small place, where it would be very easy to quickly put down so-called independence activity if there were a war. Nevertheless, due to assistance from Western countries,

Serbia surrendered and accepted a trial from an international court, with Kosovo becoming independent. Western countries supported the independence of Kosovo and expected the dissolution of Russian Federation, under the pretext of national self-determination and paramountcy of human rights, constituting political correctness.

The Catalan situation appears to be taking its own path. The referendum conforms both with the ideal of self-determination and the supremacy of human rights, fully in line with Western standards of political correctness. Western countries object to this referendum undisguisedly, fearing that it might lead to a domino effect. Catalonia was a territory during the Middle Ages, when there were no countries in the modern forms in Europe, just many territories. Therefore, if Catalonia, a place with such a historical foundation, won its independence, then territories like Basque, Aragon, Castile and Grenada could also proclaim independence, in which case Spain would be separated into several or even a dozen countries. In this way, Belgium would become three countries, the Netherlands seven countries, Switzerland three countries and France dozens of countries. Every former medieval territory can be regarded as a special place, with a special history, special culture, special residents and special identity. In this sense, they can all be considered special nations. Hence, it would be a disaster for Europe if it returned to a medieval situation. If Germany is also

divided, then Western Europe or Europe and even the whole Western world would no longer exist, which is unacceptable to Western countries. Consequently, they cannot allow Catalonia to gain independence no matter whether it is politically correct or not.

The issue of Catalan independence also leads to the question of what the EU is. Spain is just one of EU's members and the EU refers to the European integration, an integration that goes beyond nation states, according to its own statements. However, the EU ought to accept Catalan independence if the EU really goes beyond nation states, as Catalonia would only leave Spain but not Europe or the EU. Yet all primary officials of the EU say their objection to Catalan independence is to maintain Spain's sovereignty and territorial integrity. This implies that the EU recognizes Spain as a nation state. If the EU has in fact publicly admitted that Spain is a sovereign nation state on this issue, then what is the EU? As for this question, Prof. Qian opines that the EU doesn't go beyond nation states. He argues that the countries within the EU adopted a beggar-thy-neighbor policy during the European debt crisis that began in 2008, which means they can share the sweet fruit but not the bitter harvest. This became evident during the waves of refugees. As for the question of what the EU is, Prof. Qian argues that so far it has been a community of nation states, meaning that they are still organized by the unit of nation states,

but they will act together. The subject of such collective action is still the individual states. The EU has a set of rules and regulations for collective action, but this action does not transcend the boundaries of nation states. Prof. Qian said that European integration did not attempt to transcend nation states from the beginning.

Prof. Qian considered the history of the emergence of European integration as well as analyzing its causes. He argues that there was no necessity to integrate the whole of Western Europe let alone the Eastern half if the goal was only for peace. That problem focuses mainly on resolving conflicts between Germany and France. Therefore, in addition to resolving conflicts between Germany and France, there are deeper historical reasons for European integration. One is the threat from the Soviet Union, which has been elaborated on by Prof. Feng Zhongping. Another is that World War II changed a structure lasting for centuries, where Europe dominated the world. Between the new hegemony of the Soviet Union in East Europe and the new hegemony of the US in the West, the nations of Europe must unite. Demonstrating this line of reasoning, Robert Schuman, one of the EU's originators, once stated that Europe has to unite if it doesn't want to be controlled by the US.

Prof. Qian concluded that European integration is a complex phenomenon, and not as pleasant and easy as presented

by Western theorists, especially European ones. There are many things in the world, in which the better the rhetoric, the worse the reality, and that is probably the case with the EU. Ultimately, the EU is actually a community of nation states behaving together.

After the speeches by the three speakers, Prof. Wang Xi and Prof. Peng Xiaoyu from the Department of History at PKU made some comments, with the participants taking part in the discussion.

Prof. Peng Xiaoyu said that current area studies lacks socio-economic analysis. He mentioned that in terms of the Europe issues as well as current issues in the US, they need analysis from an economic perspective, just like issues in China, India and Africa. He believes that a Communist voice is required in this world. If that voice is ignored, the observation, evaluation, handling and response to a lot of problems will lose a critical angle.

Prof. Wang Xi pointed out that the formation of Europe is a kind of historical construct. Politics plays an important role in maintaining the European Union. Moreover, the political and cultural homogeneity and similarities among member states is also very strong. However, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the merger of Eastern and Western Europe, some domestic developments in the EU occurred, which led to differing developing paths and a dual-track Europe or

multi-track Europe, posing great risks for European integration. We need to pay attention to a region's historical construction, and the key to maintaining the construction, while defining the region. There is also the problem of culture. How should we define a region? English and French could be languages for British and French people, but these two languages penetrated a lot of countries with the spread of colonialism and imperialism. The thing we ought to think about is where the relationship between area studies and cultural circles lies. Are all area studies pure? What is their core impetus? What is the core institution? In this pan-cultural world, all the terms utilized in humanities and social sciences today are from the Western world. If we are going to study this area, how can we devise fresh methods? Prof. Wang also states that the reason for the EU's successful establishment is that the EU countries had a highly consistent ideology after World War II. On China's Belt and Road initiative, there is a problem worth considering. If China wants to rise as a new fresh power, which part of Chinese core values can spread all over the world and be accepted by the people it conquers, as the UK, France and the US once did? Prof. Wang put forward his own opinions in terms of national self-determination. He said that in 1918, the US President Woodrow Wilson proposed the principle of self-determination. There are three big regions in the world, Europe, China and the US. Why can't Europe become the US and why can't Europe

become China? That's the problem.

Prof. Li Qiang responded to the problem of national self-determination that Prof. Wang Xi posed. He said that Wilson advocated national self-determination, which international Communist warriors are all strongly against. The formation of the Soviet Union as a community of republics was a solution for adhering to the principle of national self-determination, one that has its historical reasons. In addition, the Soviets saw no possibility of implementing communism in European developed countries, as Marx assumed, so the idea first occurred that they could break the weak link in the chain of capitalism and develop the Party in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union was isolated after its establishment, and international Communism seemed a long way off, so the Soviets shifted their attention to Asia immediately. National self-determination was also a core part of Leninism. Lenin and Wilson were two crucial leaders of the same period, who created great institutions. Therefore, the contribution of socialism should not be forgotten.

Prof. Lian Yuru offered his response to Prof. Qian Chengdan's opinions on the nature of the EU. Scholars and politicians in Europe all regard the problems with the goal of European integration and the nature of the EU as a taboo and always avoid talking about these issues. European professors who once give lectures here stated that there is only proceeding but no goals for European integration. Since the establishment

of the European Commission, the high-level organization has been supranational, with all member states equally placed under the jurisdiction of the high-level bodies. There are many regional integration organizations in the current world. The EU is unique in its supranational nature. No other organization has transferred state sovereignty. Prof. Lian proposes a definition for the EU as a national alliance which adheres to the principle of subsidiarity. The principle of subsidiarity is a principle of Catholic sociology. The principle was incorporated into the European Union Treaty when the EU signed the Treaty of Mayo in 1993, which means that the EU should not interfere in what the member states can manage by themselves, and only get involved when member states cannot settle an issue properly but the EU can.

Prof. Feng Zhongping put forward his own views on the nature of the EU. Every step forward in EU integration requires the signing of treaties, which implies that EU members are sovereign and independent countries. Yet they need to discuss the objectives of integration while signing treaties, where all countries have a voice. France claims that its objective is to establish the United States of Europe. Germany supports this but the UK does not. The ultimate compromise is to work toward “an increasingly close national alliance.” With the goal of the EU in such a state of ambiguity, Europeans are not clear about where the integration is going at present. As for the nature of the

EU, Prof. Feng points out that it depends on the process of the handover of sovereignty during the integration. In short, the integration must be peaceful, voluntary and involve the partial transfer of sovereignty by sovereign and independent member states. At this moment, the course of sovereignty transfer has just begun. Monetary sovereignty has been transferred, but not other areas. Border police have been abandoned, but borders still exist.

Prof. Qian Chengdan said the discussion is essentially about the form of a state. This form always changes, although we don't know what it will become. Prof. Qian points out that the EU would still be a nation state, no matter how it evolves. The EU can't escape this fate unless the whole world changes dramatically.

The second half of the workshop was hosted by Feng Zhongping, a research fellow at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations.

In his presentation titled "The Social and Ideological Basis of the Rise of Right-Wing Populism in Europe," Prof. Li Qiang pointed out that right-wing populism in Europe has been on the rise in the past few years and has spread from France, Germany, and Hungary to other European countries. This phenomenon makes us wonder if right-wing populism in Europe is only witnessing a temporary rise or is going to thrive for a much longer period of time. To provide an answer to this question, we

have to understand the current situation, which requires a study of the social and ideological factors that lead to the rise of right-wing populism. Prof. Li approaches this issue with three progressive analyses. The first examines the shift in world politics from the politics of interests to the politics of identities. The second examines the relationship of right-wing populism with the politics of identities. The third examines the troublesome situation which Europe is currently facing.

A thorough investigation of the global situation reveals a shift from the more traditional politics of interests to the politics of identities. This is by far the most profound historical shift in political ideologies and principles in modern times. Politics has been characterized by the politics of interests since modern times, especially in developed Western countries. Individual interests were the main factor that determined individual political behaviors. Interests of different strata and classes were formed subsequently based on individual interests, and finally various political parties or ideologies that represent the interests of a diversity of social strata and classes came into being, such as a social democratic party and other left-wing parties which represent the working class and people from the lower class, liberal and conservative parties which represent the bourgeoisie, and so on. Party politics that evolve around interests have long been the core of Western politics. Although the politics of interests has gone through numerous changes, it has always been

the central theme of political developments in the long run. However, judging from global social and ideological trends in recent years, there has been a shift, and 2015 could be named the landmark year. The essence of the shift is the gradual replacement of the politics of interests by the politics of identity as the crucial factor that decides individual political behaviors and national political structures. The politics of identity, or identity politics, concern the identities of individuals and groups in terms of race, ethnicity, religion, gender, sexual orientation, culture and so on. The reasons that led to this shift first lay in that the traditional large-scale conflict between labor and capital is no longer the norm in developed countries due to the shrinkage of the industrial working class caused by an increased proportion of jobs in the service industry. Second, the slow rise in ordinary worker's income contradicts the overall gains that developed countries enjoyed from the free flow of global labor, capital and commodities brought about by globalization. Finally, the state of considerable agitation experienced by Western countries concerning terrorism related to radical Islam also contributed to the shift. Under these circumstances, Western countries in general witnessed a rise of political views based on national, ethnic, or religious identities. Nationalist, and in some cases even racist, discourse has once again become the mainstream of political discourse.

Identity politics has overtaken the politics of interests in

defining domestic politics and global order. It has become a powerful constitutive principle and has formed a brand new political ideology. Identity politics is now one of the forces behind the rise of right-wing ideology in the form of nationalism, racism, religious extremism and the like, as well as right-wing political power on a global scale. In Western countries, this shift is transforming the left-right political structure. The influence of traditional left-wing parties and their ideology is on the decline because the appeal they once commanded is no longer there. The traditional liberal parties are viewed with growing skepticism due to their advocacy for multiculturalism. Right-wing powers and ideologies from across the spectrum are now becoming the main forces of Western politics. Those whose main appeal is identity politics are especially popular. If we were to simplify the political situation, we would say that the left has already declined, liberalism is currently in decline, and the right is on the rise. In the process of this rise of the right, the unstoppable union of right-wing power and populism demands attention. The strong sense of deprivation suffered by lower- and middle-class people in the process of globalization has been expressed in a fierce way, in which traditional elites in politics and economics as well as the intelligentsia are seen as traitors to national interests in pursuit of globalization goals, and are thus harshly criticized.

Before Donald Trump was elected as president of the US,

the famous American political scientist Samuel Huntington published a book titled *Who are We?* in which he pointed out three different ways out of the identity issue for the US. The first is to be “the US of the world,” which is a return to Wilsonianism. The second is to be “the world of the US,” advocating the supremacy of the US, insisting on remolding the world using American values and models even if this means resorting to regime change, and it embodies George W Bush’s neo-conservatism, the third and the one that Huntington strongly advocated is to be “the US of the US” and to return to the US as a nation state and pursue its own interests. Judging from the situation now, we can say that Trump has adopted the third option to a large extent.

Compared with the US, Europe is trapped in a much more difficult situation and is faced with the severest challenge since World War II. First of all, a long term social welfare policy has weakened Europe in world economic competition. However, it is almost impossible for any change to happen under the current grand political framework. Second, the influx of Muslim immigrants, refugees and Eastern European laborers ever since European integration has started to bring pressure to the employment situation in rising countries. Moreover, an already completely secularized Europe after the Enlightenment lacks sufficient spiritual and material power to protect its own system and culture from the challenge of Islamic radicalism. Under

such circumstances, right-wing ideologies gain increasing momentum in leading the defense against the challenge of Islamic radicalism and mobilizing the masses. Though the far-right may not be able to seize power in major European countries in the short term, right-wing ideologies and policies exert relatively strong influence on public opinion and government policies. The threat that Europe faces therefore lies in the possibility of the domination of major countries' politics by far-right forces. If far-right forces do dominate politics in major European countries, the process of European integration would be severely impeded, which would in turn profoundly impact the politics and economy in Europe as well as the world economy.

Many of the founding fathers of the EU hope to realize the dream of establishing the United States of Europe. However, no such political community can be easily built up if no common identity exists. The European Union as a political community, however, lacks precisely a strong and common European identity. Therefore, it is worth asking the following questions. How long will the EU last? How would the EU disintegrate?

From the cultural perspective, this is not only a challenge to the EU, but also a fundamental challenge to the whole of European civilization after the Enlightenment. The Enlightenment in Europe was based on liberalism; it emphasized individual rights, liberty, democracy, reason and toleration, and

has evolved from its initial religious tolerance to multiculturalism. However, this grand cultural trend is now up against tremendous difficulties under the pincer attack of pre-modernism and post-modernism. Huge uncertainty exists in whether or not modern European culture will suffer a major setback, and whether or not the EU that represents the ideal of the Enlightenment can withstand current challenges.

Prof. Li concluded that the structure of world politics is gradually transforming from the politics of interests to the politics of identity, a shift that will profoundly influence individuals' political behavior. It will also profoundly influence the operational model of states, or even the world. This will eventually bring about an entirely new political structure that we have to face.

Shen Jian, chairman of the Chinese Society of French Historical Studies and professor at Zhejiang University, gave a presentation entitled "Insights Sparked by Neo-populism in France." Prof. Shen began with an analysis of the confusion inherent in the definition of populism. Different from other "-isms," populism has no systematic theories and no representative theorists. "*Populisme*" in French is usually used as a derogatory term similar in meaning to "*demagogie*," a word derived from the Greek root "demo," meaning "people," and "ago," meaning "to guide." It appeared rather late in French, etymologically coming from the Russian word "*populiste*"

meaning populist. *Populisme* has another meaning referring to writers writing for the people, but it is now no longer commonly used even in the literary field. Recent discussion on populism is related to the rise of French far-right forces. French political scientist Pierre-André Taguieff defined populism in 1984 as a “solution of the authoritarian” which is built on the charisma of the leader and is characterized by its call for the people to oppose the oligarchic rule of the elites. This definition led to wide discussion later on in the 80s and 90s.

French historian Michel Winock cited this definition and divided populism into several levels. It is a “protest movement” (*un mouvement protestataire*) — it opposes the elites such as intellectual elites and political figures who are “detached from the people.” Meanwhile it can also be counted as “national-populist” (*national-populisme*), an “identity movement” (*un mouvement identitaire*) — it is nationalist, protectionist, xenophobic, Islamophobic, and opposed to European integration. However, this definition is still not clear enough. Is it a political symptom (*symptôme*) and phenomenon (*phénomène*) that refers to the interests of the people with seditious rhetorical language who pursue personal political interests in the name of the people, or simply a style, a posture, a form without substance, or an emotional expression?

Prof. Shen continued to discuss the definition of populism in French history. If we search for populism on Wikipedia in

English and French respectively, we may find out that interestingly, the English entry defines French populism as starting from the Middle Ages and including the French Revolution. However, the French entry doesn't include these but only Boulangist movement and Poujadist movement. From a linguistic perspective, the French refers only to negative events as populism. There are disputes, as charismatic leaders like Robespierre and Louis Bonaparte who also resort to the people are not counted as populists. Therefore, the French only classify definite bad characters as populism while leaving aside controversial figures when dealing with populism in history. From here we can see the attitude of French people toward populism.

Prof. Shen analyzed the rise of neo-populism in France. Of the two schools of neo-populism, the National Front (now known as the National Rally) was not recognized as populist until recently. It was established in 1972, right at the very end of the political spectrum, and was initially considered fascist. It indeed modeled itself on the Italian Neo-Fascist party the Italian Social Movement (*Movimento Sociale Italiano*, MSI), and claimed to be “the right wing of the society, of the people and of the nation,” and opposed the perceived establishment. Its slogans at first were “objecting to the outdated, corrupted, and incapable majority” and “objecting to destructive, Utopian, and repressive communism.” Its leader Jean-Marie Le Pen soon

added his own ideas into the party's platform: opposition to immigration, exclusionism, raising the birth rate in order to increase the French population, and so on. The notion of opposing immigration was gradually accepted by part of the French public, as reflected in the party's results in elections. In its first decade, the National Front achieved little in elections, winning usually no more than 1% of the votes. The trend changed in 1983 and the party started to earn more than 10% of the votes in all kinds of elections. In the 1995 presidential election, the party leader Le Pen gained more than 15% of the votes. Later on in 2002, Le Pen entered the second round of the presidential election for the first time.

In 1998 the party witnessed internal fracture and was weakened for a while. After Marine Le Pen succeeded her father as the party's chairperson, the party experienced a second burst of development. Marine Le Pen focused on the reversal of the demonization of the party and was more moderate than her father. She is not an anti-Semite and opposes racism, and did not touch on the topics of World War II or colonialist wars, and therefore improved the image of the National Front. Her policies include proposing "nationals first" in subsidies, employment and so on. She advocates secularization and is against religious groups, halal food provision in school canteens and different opening hours for males and females in municipal swimming pools. She is against immigration as well as economic

globalization, and supports tighter controls on banks by the state. She calls for an improvement in public security and strengthening the punishment of criminals by life imprisonment and life sentences. In terms of political institutions, she advocates that the 7-year presidential term should be restored but should be non-renewable. She proposes that constitutional amendments should be decided by the people via referendums, and referendums should be initiated solely by the people instead of the current shared initiative scheme, and that elections should be run on a proportional representation system. She proposes pulling out of NATO and that it should be the people who decide whether or not France should leave the EU or the Eurozone. With these planks in her platform, the votes for Marine Le Pen were on a steady rise. In 2012 she was ranked third among all candidates in the first round of the presidential election, with 17.9% of all the votes, even higher than her father's best achievement. In the municipal elections in 2014, the National Front secured 1,544 seats in municipal councils, with some of its candidates winning in the first round. In the European Parliamentary elections in the same year, the National Front won 24.86% of all the votes, more than any other French party. In the 2014 French Senate election, two members of the National Front were elected, marking the first time that the party had a member in the Senate. Later on in the 2017 presidential elections, Marine Le Pen entered the second round of elections without any

suspense.

The other school of neo-populism is the left-wing “Indomitable France” under the leadership of Jean-Luc Antoine Pierre Mélenchon. Mélenchon is viewed as populist because he seeks to abolish the French Fifth Republic and establish the Sixth Republic, proposes to re-sign the EU treaty and change EU monetary policy and, if not achievable, unilaterally withdraw from the EU and sign treaties with other countries separately. Although he claims to be pro-European, Mélenchon is still seen as a Eurosceptic because a re-negotiation of the EU treaty is impossible, which means that he would definitely withdraw from the EU unilaterally. His language in the media and public gatherings is extremely provocative and appears to be extra sharp. He published a brochure titled “The Era of the People” (*L'Ère du Peuple*) in 2014. In it, he proposed that the people should overthrow the rich and the oligarchy, the gilded castes of the politicians who serve only the interests of the rich, and media tycoons who paralyze people’s minds. He also holds that the hatred of populism is actually a variant of the fear of the people.

The forces of populism witnessed an upsurge in the 2017 French presidential election. Five among all 11 presidential candidates had a real potential for winning, all of whom had interesting slogans. The slogan of the Socialist Party’s leader Benoît Hamon was, “Make France’s Heart Beat (Again)” (*Faire*

battre le Cœur de la France), François Fillon of the right wing used the slogan “Willpower for France” (*Unevolonté pour la France*), Emmanuel Macron of the “Onward!” party used the slogan “Together, France!” (*Ensemble, la France!*), Marine Le Pen chose “In the Name of the People” (*Au Nom du Peuple*) [later changed to “Choose France” (*Choisir la France*)], and Jean-Luc Mélenchon used the slogan “the Force of the People” (*La Force du Peuple*). Three slogans used the word “France” against two slogans using “people.” The latter was used by those referred to as populists, while the established parties in the system mostly used “France” instead of “people.” In the first round of the election, Le Pen got 21.3% of the vote and Macron 24%. Fillon and Macron, the only ones who truly support the EU, even when combined earned less than 50% of the votes. A more detailed analysis of the voters’ political stances shows that those on the left and the far left supported Mélenchon and Hamon, those on the right supported Fillon, Macron won the middle, and Le Pen was on the far right. The upper and middle classes mainly supported Macron, Fillon, or Hammon, while the lower classes supported Le Pen and Mélenchon. In terms of age groups, young voters mainly supported Mélenchon, slightly older voters supported Le Pen, middle-age voters voted for Macron, and old voters were for Fillon. If the youth represent the future, whether the future is bright or not would be a question.

Finally, Prof. Shen briefly analyzed the challenges brought about by populism. First of all, populism impacts mainstream ideologies in the West. A paradox in the notion of “the people” exists when we put populism and democracy side by side. Although “populism” derives from “people” and democratic politics is based on “the people” with the most important principle being popular sovereignty, the former has a negative connotation while the latter a positive one. This would inevitably cause doubt as to whether there exist two different “peoples,” and if appealing to the people can be judged to be bad or good. The key to the problem is the vagueness of the connotation of “the people.” Who are “the people”? Who can represent “the people”? These questions can have different answers. Tension exists between the abstract concept of “the people” and the individuality that is carried out in actual practice, such as “one person one vote” and “every vote equal,” which has pushed the French to reflect upon their own political system. The second challenge of populism is that it impacts proletarian theory. As the working-class gradually shift toward voting for the right wing and holding an oppositional stance toward globalization, important questions rise and ask for our attention. What exactly is the historical role of the working class? In what way could the proletariat of the world unite? How should the proletariat liberate all humanity in order to liberate themselves? Third, there’s the impact on economic globalization.

Globalization, promoted initially by the West, is now opposed by its own people. A reshuffle of national interests produced by economic globalization requires new adjustments and rebalancing. And finally there are also challenges to the integration of Europe. France as the engine of European integration is now being challenged by French voters.

Kong Tianping, a research fellow in the Institute of European Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, gave a presentation titled “The Conflict between the ‘Poland-Hungary Axis’ and the EU, and its Repercussions.” Kong holds that one of the crucial challenges the EU faces nowadays is problematic member states, namely Poland and Hungary. In recent years, although populist political forces are on a steady rise in Europe, no populist forces got into power in Western Europe. However, populist parties in Central Europe have successfully seized power in Hungary and Poland. The Hungarian parliamentary election finished on April 8, in which Viktor Orbán was elected the third time after 2010 and 2014.

The ruling Law and Justice Party in Poland is also a right-wing populist nationalist party. It won the presidential election and the parliamentary election of 2015 by a landslide. It can be said that the “Poland-Hungary Axis” came into being right after the Law and Justice Party got into power in 2015. On the one hand, there’s the “France-Germany Axis” acting as the engine of European integration; on the other hand, there’s the

“Poland-Hungary Axis” that possesses power destructive to European integration that cannot be underrated, although both Poland and Hungary as relatively new members of the EU aren’t as important as France or Germany in all aspects including economic.

The cause of the formation of the “Poland-Hungary Axis” first lies in the common foundation moulded when two parties of almost identical ideas rose into power respectively in the two countries. Orbán and the Polish ruling party’s chairman Jarosław Kaczyński share very similar political ideas. They both object to the transformation started in 1989. Orbán sees the changes in Hungary since 1990 as incomplete, because no new constitution has been adopted. Kaczyński goes even further, as he totally rejects the agreement between the Polish United Worker’s Party and Solidarity. He views the agreement as a deal between the two, in which the dignitaries of the Communist Party retain their wealth and privileges, and in turn the elites of Solidarity could take part in the government. Kaczyński holds that Poland is now in a morbid post-communist status which he hopes the rise of Law and Justice Party to power will shatter. Both the Hungarian and Polish parties are against liberal democracy. Orbán argues, “The new state that we are constructing in Hungary is an illiberal state, a non-liberal state. It does not reject the fundamental principles of liberalism such as freedom, but it does not make this ideology the central element of state organization,

but instead includes a different, special, national approach.”

Kaczyński also argues that a state based on the rule of law does not have to be a democratic state, and that a democratic state based on the rule of law cannot be equated to a state based on the rule of law. Furthermore, they share a sense of Euroscepticism and oppose European integration. As Orbán sees it, the EU is made up of member states, and EU institutions are to facilitate cooperation between members. He argues that the current practice is completely against this principle, and people seem to have the impression that the EU is made up of various institutions and that the sole purpose of the member states is to support the operation of these institutions. Orbán thinks that the EU has made three mistakes. The first is to strengthen the power of the European Parliament, which impaired the efficiency of the institutions. The second was to reform the European Commission into a political actor, which is drastically different from the role of a guardian of the treaties. Third, the EU made it possible for the Council to represent vital interests of member states with a majority vote instead of consensus in order to raise the efficiency of the Union. Kaczyński is also a critic of the EU, and sees it as an organization led by a single country, Germany. He holds that “we need a Europe of nation-states and less centralized power,” and clearly advocates the need for re-negotiating the EU treaties.

The second factor that led to the formation of the

“Poland-Hungary Axis” is the shared ruling strategies of their ruling parties. Judging from recent years, especially the political events from 2010 to 2015, Hungary has truly firmly established an illiberal democracy. The current ruling party in Hungary has been winning a supermajority of seats in the parliament for three consecutive elections and has the power to amend any law and the constitution. Starting from 2010, Orbán not only amended the constitution but also constrained the power of independent institutions and weakened the independence of the Central Bank, the Constitutional Court and other courts. An amendment of the Constitutional Court Law was passed in Poland in 2016 that gave the ruling party total control of the constitution. In the past year, the Law and Justice Party strived to curtail the independence of courts and to increase the control of the ruling party over them. In terms of economic policies, the party completely parted ways with the neo-liberal economic policies initiated in 1990 and started to emphasize state intervention, nationalization, and social welfare.

The debate between the “Poland-Hungary Axis” and the EU is partly focused on democracy and the rule of law. The EU deems that Poland and Hungary have shaken the legal institutions and impacted the common values of Europe. Another focus of the debate is the solution to the refugee issue. Poland and Hungary object to the EU’s refugee quota scheme, and although few refugees are choosing Poland and Hungary as

their destination, politicians have seized on the refugee issue to create fear. Finally, there's also the disagreement over the operation of the EU institutions and the future of Europe. The "Poland-Hungary Axis" is opposed to the EU Committee and calls for returning power to member states.

In the end, Kong pointed out that both Poland and Hungary used to be models of participating in European integration, but are now problematic members of the EU, which could have profound repercussions for the integration of Europe.

Prof. Lian Yuru from PKU's School of International Studies gave a presentation titled "An Analysis of the EU policy of Germany's New Government under Angela Merkel." Prof. Lian first analyzed the nature of the EU and explained the reason why she chose Germany as object of her analysis. The EU is of mixed characteristics and its nature is twofold. It is on the one hand a body for inter-governmental cooperation, and on the other hand a super-nation. The European integration process started after World War II represents an abandonment of prewar concepts such as the Europe of ideologies, the Europe of military governments, or the Europe of equilibrium. It emphasized that in the postwar era everyone should build Europe together through mutual agreements on a voluntary basis. These agreements should not be signed until all member states arrived at a consensus, and should be passed in each and every member states after ratification.

European integration first started in Western Europe after World War II. This is closely connected with the solution of the issue of Germany. Therefore, understanding Europe must start from knowing and understanding Germany. Knowledge of Germany is a key to solving the crisis in Europe. In the past one decade, Europe has been facing a series of severe crises and challenges that are piling up and spreading. In this circumstance, where existing EU institutions and political elites performed unsatisfactorily, the role of German Chancellor Angela Merkel thus became unusually high profile. Opinions on her way of dealing with crises varied. For example, her approach in the Ukraine crisis was applauded and she was considered a leader, but she was criticized for being hegemony in the Greek crisis and the European debt crisis. Her decisions in the face of the refugee crisis made her the target of satire as a loner who pursues moral imperialism. Europe found itself in a mire of structural imbalance under the strong leadership of Germany. Therefore, an analysis of the EU policy of Germany's Merkel government is crucial to understanding the challenges and choices facing Europe.

Angela Merkel was voted the German chancellor for the fourth time in the German Bundestag on March 14, 2018. She visited France on the second day of her chancellorship and kicked off the implementation of her EU policy. Merkel's policy on the EU has maintained a clear continuity throughout her time

in office, and is reflected in her strong preference for the coalition approach, which is different from the community approach actively advocated by the President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker. The community approach is of a super-national nature. The European Commission would give legislative advice and put forward drafts, which would then be discussed and decided by the European Parliament and the Council of the EU. The coalition approach that Merkel prefers is of the same nature as inter-government cooperation, and relies on the Council of the EU to discuss and vote on issues. The Council consists of state and government heads of all member states, and adopts consensus as the only way for approval.

The above two approaches are usually considered antagonistic to one another, but Merkel is opposed to this view. According to Merkel, the coalition approach is first of all a comprehensive approach. She sees it as a comprehensive method combining the community approach and the coordinated actions between member states. The EU should not be treated as a divisible object, but as an indivisible entity. An attractive goal of EU policy needs all members of the Union to coordinate to realize it. Merkel holds this as the substance of the coalition approach. Merkel further explains that the key to the problem is not which of the two approaches should we choose, but whether the EU members are taking action or not.

The guideline of the coalition approach is the principle of

subsidiarity laid down in the Treaty of Lisbon. According to this principle, the EU should not interfere in cases where member states are capable of handling the issues at hand, and should interfere only when member states are not able to deal with the problems they are facing. The principle of subsidiarity consists of three aspects: self-help, help from others, and functionality. Merkel handled the European debt crisis according to this principle. Greece should investigate the root of the crisis after its debt crisis occurred, and if the cause is its own problem, then it should do its work and help itself. Other EU member states should shoulder respective responsibilities when necessary and carry out help from the outside.

The fundamental point of Merkel's coalition approach is the emphasis on the role of each member state of the EU. Germany is the strongest member of the EU, and some of the current problems facing the Union have a close relationship with the structural unbalance of the Union and with the might of Germany. Europe seeks balance in its development and cannot stand any country growing out of control or gaining hegemony. Theoretically speaking this applies to all countries, but in reality it is mainly used against Germany, who carries the historical baggage of the Nazis. The postwar European integration effort originated in Western Europe as a solution to the Germany question, and was a process to restrict Germany or rebalance its power. Germany has many high indicators in economic and

social development, a situation rarely seen globally in recent years, putting it in a strong position as it faces the crises in Europe.

It enjoys high economic growth and the best employment rate since unification. Salaries are on the rise and its finances are running a surplus rather than a deficit. In this circumstance, Germany's good performance actually isolated itself. Stressing the importance and priority of helping themselves would certainly push weaker countries into uniting against Germany's hegemony.

Prof. Lian speculates that Merkel would continue to pursue the coalition approach she preferred in EU policy and stress the role of individual member states in her fourth term. Germany among all EU member states has the biggest population and the highest capabilities, and with its potential, how to resolve the problem of structural imbalance in Europe is indeed a crucial question. Germans have to have the "sensitivity of the fingertips" in dealing with other countries' sensitive nerves to rescue Germany out of this dilemma.

Prof. Wang Xi from the History Department of PKU commented on the previous four presentations, pointing out that the first two speakers focused on populism whereas the other two gave analyses of specific cases. Prof. Huang Liaoyu from the German Studies Center of PKU also made some short comments. Prof. Huang pointed out that the reality the EU is

facing now is its dropping support rate and the growing schism between member states. The reason behind this centrifugal trend lies in the growing problem in the bond that holds the EU together. The economic, political, and developmental model of each member state varies greatly and there's a lack of common ground.

Prof. Qian Chengdan posed a question to Prof. Li as: What's the connection between China's people-centered doctrine and populism?

Prof. Li answered: The politics of interests has its own specific definition. Individual interests form class interests, which then form political parties based on ideologies. There's a clear division between the interests of different classes. It can be argued that interest is to a certain extent a factor in the politics of the politics of identity. For example, the majority of Trump's supporters are blue-collar white males. It might be assumed that their interests are harmed by competition from Mexican immigrants working at low wages. However, a closer analysis of this shows that the immigrants and blue collar workers rarely compete for the same jobs, so logically racial resentment is not simply the politics of interest. The politics of identity, however, hinges on racial or ethnic issues, which is different from the economic basis of the former politics of interests.

Could a common European constitution be the basis of an identity? There are political theories about constitutional

patriotism. The US is different from Europe in that although there was no notion of a nation of America before the constitution came into being in the US, the thirteen colonies gradually formed a notion of a people. Europe, in contrast, did not form a people and its languages and cultures are different from one another. For this reason it's hard to form an identity based on a common constitution. Populism is not so different from democracy — people categorize what they don't like as populism. However, the mature democratic system in modern Europe is not pure democracy. The democracy structures of the US and the UK both have democratic and non-democratic elements. What populism calls for is the elimination all non-democratic elements. Populism is not horrible on its own, and China's people-centered ideology also contains very thick populist thoughts. The horrible part of the issue at hand is the marriage between populism and right-wing powers. The vehement xenophobic, intolerant populism this produces will bring about a number of terrible consequences.

Prof. Wang's question for researcher Kong was: Is there any historical connection between Poland and Hungary? Why are these two countries not like others?

Prof. Kong said the Polish and the Hungarian people are different races, but in both the Polish and Hungarian languages there's a poem about two brothers drinking together and battling side by side. In history there were Hungarians as the king of the

Poles, and Hungary and Poland supported each other when the Soviet Union attempted to exert influence over them. The recent formation of the illiberal democratic axis is more of a result of the development of domestic politics. The two countries had different strategies for the transformation that started from 1990. Hungary adopted incrementalism and used to perform better than Poland, but is now overtaken by the latter. On the other hand, Poland is a successfully transformed country; its economy has been on a steady increase after a drop in the first two years, but this nevertheless didn't stop the country from turning toward illiberal democracy. The problem reflected in the current circumstances is that the population of small cities and the rural areas outside large cities generally do not feel that they have gained from the transformation. In aspects of culture and religion, both Kaczyński and Orbán express at public events that more stress should be laid on the motherland and having a country with a strong nation. They both emphasize traditional history, Christianity and the family, instead of the current liberalism, cosmopolitanism, multiculturalism and moral relativism. Prof. Li observes that the left and liberals are on the decline and the right is on the rise, which is exactly the case in Poland and Hungary.

Prof. Wang asked Prof. Lian if Merkel's approach would succeed. Prof. Lian said whether or not Merkel's approach would work out is a question that reveals the dilemma in which

Germany is stuck. Europe needs Germany but also hesitates to recognize Germany's leadership. On the one hand this is due to the shadow of Nazi Germany in history, and on the other hand it is because Germany is a mighty power. Former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt holds that isolation is the largest problem facing Germany. Germany should never be isolated — not by itself and certainly not by others. The solution to this problem may lie in stressing the leading role of the double engine of France and Germany.