

## **The 19th New Buds Salon**

### **Relations between China and its Neighbors after COVID-19: South Asia**

**July 12, 2020**

It has been a once-in-a-century challenge for China to combat COVID-19, which broke out at the start of 2020. The pandemic not only altered people's lifestyle, but also brought tremendous changes to the geopolitical environment. In light of this, the Institute of Area Studies, Peking University (PKUIAS) organized a series of New Buds salons under the theme "Relations between China and its Neighbors after COVID-19," inviting young scholars at home and abroad to discuss the development of China's relations with neighboring regions and countries. This salon focused on the future of Sino-South Asian relations, especially Sino-Indian relations. The meeting was moderated by Xu Chuanbo, a postdoctoral fellow of PKUIAS.

Zhang Jing, a postdoctoral fellow of PKUIAS, gave a presentation entitled "How Hindu Nationalism Affects Sino-Indian Relations." She believes that as a political party born from Hindu nationalism, it is hard to separate Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)'s hardball approach toward China from its high-profile ideology. For a long time, Hindu nationalism has played an important role in helping the party win at the ballot box, as well as building national identity. With the pandemic spreading in India, it is an indisputable fact that the Indian government took advantage of surging nationalist sentiment to divert public attention from social conflicts. However, to a large extent, the deterioration of Sino-Indian relations in recent years can be attributed to the deep cultural meaning and political logic of Hindu nationalism. Within this special framework, it is almost inevitable for China and India to clash unceasingly over boundary issues.

From a political perspective, in August 2019, the Modi government, which has just begun its second term, eagerly turned its attention to Kashmir. On October 31, the "Jammu and Kashmir Reorganization Bill" came into effect, providing legal justifications for India to change the status quo of Sino-Indian border issues while also acting as the trigger of renewed border conflict. One core proposition of Hindu nationalism is a

complete India, which requires national unity, territorial integrity and border security in order to construct a holy land and ideal home for Hindus. Since India's independence, Pakistan and China, with whom India have had territory disputes, have always been worries of Hindu nationalists. Recently, India has also been in conflict with Pakistan and Nepal over border issues. It can be seen that in practice, a theoretical framework based on Hinduism has had a severe impact on border areas.

From an economic perspective, the Modi government proposed to build India into a global manufacturing center during the 2019 election. When COVID-19 struck in early 2020, India saw a chance to replace China as the world's largest manufacturer as China was busy fighting the pandemic. However, the Indian economy had already shown signs of recession, and the Modi government, determined to reform, had no choice but to adopt protectionist policies and withdrew from Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). Although this protectionism is complementary to Modi's goals of Indian manufacturing and self-reliance, he still expects accomplishments premised on the rise of India's great power. Now that COVID-19 has broken out in India on a large scale, the country's economy is crippled, drifting away from India's original dream of great power. In this context, boycotting Chinese goods in India triggered by a Sino-Indian border conflict is not only a vent for social sentiment, but also reflects a strong desire to reshape Indian trade relations with the world. In addition, as India is increasingly drawing close to the US, boycotting Chinese goods has also become a natural option. However, this will compound India's economic plight. India lacks a high-quality investment environment and fails to integrate well into the major global supply chains. In addition, India still relies on China's imports in all aspects, so its economic development will pay a high price due to the boycott.

In essence, Hindu nationalism originated in the Indian Independence Movement and includes three elements: a common country, a common race, and a common culture and civilization. Narrowly defined Hindu nationalism deems both British colonists and Muslims as foreigners coming to their sacred land, but basically Hindu nationalism is a mental response accompanying anti-colonization and de-Westernization. With the background of a post-colonial context and a rising China, China has become a perfect "target"

for nationalists. Hindu nationalists try to use China's penetration into every aspect of Indian life to awaken colonial memories, making China a psychological equivalent of colonists in India.

Zhang Jing thinks that despite India turning to the US more openly, the Modi government still implemented a strategically autonomous policy. Although conservative Hindu nationalism is the ruling foundation of the BJP, in general, the Modi government has adopted pragmatic strategies in diplomacy and economics, and still lays hopes on its tough attitude and rising domestic nationalism to force China to offer more concessions. However, with the continuous decline of India's economy and the spread of COVID-19, the BJP had less of a chance to give full play to Sino-Indian relations. In short, directed by the logic of Hindu nationalism, the forecast for Sino-India relations is not optimistic. In addition, the Indian economic and pandemic situation will also bring the bilateral relationship into a future with more uncertainty.

Zhu Xiaochao, a doctoral student at China Institute of Boundary and Ocean Studies at Wuhan University, gave a presentation titled "Observing the Logic of Modi from Indian Major Operations along the Border in the Past Three Years." Since 2017, India has launched four major operations in its northern border area, resulting in the 2017 China-India border standoff (or Doklam standoff), the Indian revocation of Jammu and Kashmir's special status, the Ladakh military exercise, and the Galwan Valley clash.

There were similar domestic and international factors in these border operations. At home, they all helped divert Indian domestic attention. By stirring up nationalist sentiment, the Indian government used the Doklam standoff to divert domestic attention from the Darjeeling riots; the revocation of Jammu and Kashmir's special status was an effective means to distract public dissatisfaction from the economic situation; the Ladakh military exercise transferred the pressure brought about by the revocation of the special status; and the Galwan Valley clash was driven by the need to shift pressure from the pandemic and locust plague in India. Internationally, these operations all aimed to serve as a check on China's power, serving the interests of the US. Both the Doklam standoff and Ladakh military exercise coincided with Modi's visits to the US. Therefore, the border standoff was conducted to gratify the US as a gift ahead of their meetings. There are also major events related to the US that occurred just before the revocation of Jammu and Kashmir's

special status. The trade war has affected US-Indian relations, which take a significant role in all Indian foreign relations. Therefore, India must take actions to ease bilateral relations, and the conflict in the Galwan Valley was therefore its hidden assistance to the US.

There are also differences in these border operations. In the Doklam standoff and Galwan Valley clash, India chose to provoke China along the border areas, which seriously affected the development of normal relations between the two countries and was not conducive to the fundamental interests of both. Since the Doklam incident, both leaders have made joint efforts to promote bilateral relations. During the clash in Galwan Valley, China and India reached a consensus, keeping affairs under control as well as safeguarding the overall situation. In the revocation event and Ladakh military exercise, India drew Pakistan in so as to push China, rather than aiming at China directly. Zhu Xiaochao believed that the four operations showed that Modi took into account both domestic and international factors when making major decisions. Domestically, the main purpose was to divert public attention. Internationally, the principle was to try to cater to the US while containing China appropriately. Generally speaking, these decisions are mostly stalling tactics which shall not alter the normal development of diplomatic relations between China and India. Since 2017, India has conducted four radical operations on the border. Considering the Sino-Indian and Sino-Pakistani border issues have not yet been completely resolved, the future will definitely see more conflicts stirred by India, for which China should be fully prepared in the following ways. First, hold contempt for the enemy strategically. The normal development of Sino-Indian relations is the general trend, and India's actions on the border are mostly caused by its domestic conflicts. We should treat India and Western countries in a different way because it is the latter who want to make China a scapegoat for the pandemic. Second, tactically take the enemy seriously. In the face of Indian operations, Chinese border defense forces should increase their troops appropriately, and when necessary, we can deter India by military drills, and other ways. Our ultimate goal is to send a signal to India: Enough is enough, and there is a limit to our patience!

Duan Bin, a doctoral student in the History Department of East China Normal University, summarized the road construction in northern border area and its influence after

Indian independence. He said that building border roads is conducive to facilitating military mobilization, ensuring the transportation of logistical materials, enhancing the sustainability of combat, and strengthening defense capabilities. The action itself is also a sign of national administrative jurisdiction and national sovereignty. At the same time, border roads can promote the exchange and integration of personnel and materials between the border area and the interior, thus strengthening national unity. The game around border road construction between China and India in the Himalayas and Karakoram regions is the epitome of geopolitical competition. Indian border road construction can also be used as a barometer to observe India's border strategy toward China.

After Indian independence in 1947, the Nehru government seized the area south of the "McMahon Line" and expanded the so-called "New Forward Policy" marked by "administrative jurisdiction," in which the construction of border roads played an important role. In February 1951, the "North and Northeast Border Defense Committee" was established, and then an assessment report involving Sikkim, Bhutan, and the "Northeast Frontier Special Zone" was submitted, suggesting that military police should be reorganized and deployed in these border areas, and airports and roads should be built. According to this report, India built strategic roads and helicopter aprons on a large scale and established a complete aviation route in southern Tibet with virgin forests throughout. Since airborne materials could be transported to checkpoints via the route, India smoothly advanced its defense border to the illegitimate "McMahon Line."

In March 1960, in order to overcome the procrastination and inefficiency of border road construction, the Nehru government set up a "Border Road Project." With Nehru personally serving as chairman and Defense Minister VK Krishna Menon as the vice chair, this project built a large number of strategic roads in Indian northern border states, Nepal and Bhutan. It was these roads that made it possible for India to successfully encroach on territories in the Aksai Chin region, which in the end directly led to Sino-Indian War in 1962.

After the Sino-Indian War in 1962, India soon implemented its so-called national defense modernization, and with military assistance from the UK and US, accelerated road construction on the side of its actual control. Meanwhile, the "Border Road Project" still remained as a permanent organization of

military-civilian integration led by the Indian Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Transport. It was called the “Indian Border Roads Organization,” and was responsible for Indian domestic disaster relief, border road construction and overseas infrastructure construction. Indian border road construction after 1962 embodied the border defensive strategic thinking of the Indian government, that is, to strengthen the construction of railways and roads from the inland to border states as much as possible, and advance patrol trail construction in actual controlled areas, which objectively led to the Line of Actual Control (LAC) between China and India. However, based on the lessons learned during war in 1962, the Indian government generally avoided building roads close to the border and implemented a policy of “strengthening the walls and clearing up the crop fields,” in order to prevent the Chinese army from utilizing these roads to invade India. They anticipated that once fighting started again, the rugged terrain would delay China’s offense, giving time for the Indian army to counterattack. In some strategic locations, India still accelerated road construction and even built fortifications across the border, striving to expand its scope along one side of LAC, which also led to the Sino-Indian Nathu La clashes in 1967, the border road construction in the Sikkim section of the China-India boundary in 1974, and the Sumdorong Chu incident in 1986. Since 2000, Indian border strategy toward China was no longer simply defending along the LAC, but to build 63 strategic roads in border areas. In doing so, India not only guaranteed its strategic supply logistics, but also relied on a dense strategic road network to deter China on a small scale by mobilizing superior forces in border areas. In addition, when the Sino-Indian border issue failed to be resolved again and again, the Indian government strengthened its control over their side of the LAC in its eastern section by building a large number of strategic roads, while advancing as much as possible in the western section to occupy more area, aiming to make edges for future negotiations over establishing the LAC and delimiting the boundary. Tong Yutao, a doctoral student in PKU’s School of International Studies, gave a presentation titled “From Doklam to the Galwan Valley: Beware of Three Changes in the Sino-Indian Border Issue.” He believed that the Doklam standoff in 2017 and the confrontation in East Ladakh this year essentially indicate that the Sino-Indian border issue is undergoing three changes that will have significant impact on

the “status quo” of the issue and the development of Sino-Indian relations. First, the actual balance of power between China and India in border areas is changing, and India is gaining more power. The confrontations in Doklam and East Ladakh were both due to the fact that road and bridge construction in a controlled area of one side were regarded as an attempt to change the “status quo.” However, in recent years, it was India who has been trying to change the “status quo,” as the Indian government has always expected to change the balance of power in this disputed area.

In recent years, Indian infrastructure construction in border areas has suddenly been strengthened. One important factor is that after the BJP government led by Modi came to power, the Indian central government has paid more attention to border infrastructure construction. Now we face the reality that Indian material power on one side of the LAC has been significantly improved. Henceforth, with the increase of both India and China’s overall national strength, infrastructure construction activities in border areas will surely grow. In the future, friction and confrontations over such issues are more likely to happen. Therefore, avoiding conflict escalation amid the normal state of frequent confrontations, while also effectively containing Indian unilateral alteration of the status quo, remain challenges.

Second, the binding force of existing border treaties on modes of frontier military interaction may be diminished. In many places along the border, two LACs identified by two countries overlap each other, whereas in some parts the LAC recognized by one is actually situated at the rear of the LAC of the other. Sometimes, the recognition of the LAC varies by only a few meters, but in other places it can be several kilometers. Therefore, every time the opposing patrol team appears within the area of one’s LAC, it will be regarded as an attempt to alter the “status quo.”

Seeing that there is no solution to the delineation of the LAC, China and India will focus more on management and control. The two countries have successively signed the Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas (1993), the Agreement between India and China on Confidence-Building Measures in the Military Field along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas (1996), the Agreement on the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the India-China Boundary

Question (2005), the Agreement on the Establishment of a Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs (2012), and the Border Defense Cooperation Agreement between India and China (2013).

Thanks to the constraints of these treaties, there has been no shooting along the Sino-Indian border in past decades, and even after confrontations, channels of communication can still be guaranteed and kept open. However, the current issue is whether India is willing to continue to abide by the treaties when there are casualties. More importantly, as India's frontier military deployment increases and infrastructure construction advances, India may partly break away from the treaty restrictions by means of expanding its troops, normalizing cross-line patrols and so on, so as to make their operations a fait accompli.

Finally, the border issue might become the core issue of China-India relations in the future. Ranking this issue properly in relations shall be an important test for the bilateral relationship in the future. After 1962, China and India both roughly agreed to shelve the dispute and let the border issue give way to other important bilateral cooperation and development topics. However, after the casualties, nationalist sentiment in India has surged. At present, India has decided to gradually dilute the conflict and resolve the border issue peacefully, but on other strategic issues, India may adopt a more unfavorable attitude toward China. In the future, since the Sino-Indian border issue is temporarily unresolved, this problem is likely to be the core of the overall China-Indian relationship, and will exert a negative effect on other areas of cooperation.

For the time being, it is not in India's national interest to provoke or escalate a border conflict. The Indian government desires to butter both sides of its bread in the current international situation and seek the most substantial benefits for itself. As for China, it has always pursued a foreign policy of building friendship with neighboring countries, hoping to achieve common development and prosperity with India, also an emerging power. We hope that when the eastern Ladakh standoff comes to an end, China-India relations will be back on the track of dialogue as before, and the border issue can be placed at an appropriate position in bilateral relations to avoid being an obstacle.

Sui Xuemeng, a doctoral student in the School of International Studies at PKU, gave a presentation titled



“Changes of US Attitudes on the China-India Border Issue from the Perspective of the China-US-India Strategic Triangle.” Sui said that since Modi came to power, US attitudes on the Sino-Indian border issue have undergone changes. The US became more willing to directly intervene in the dispute. President Trump stated that the US is ready and willing to mediate the Sino-Indian border dispute. At the same time, the US favors India. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo declared that China has taken incredibly aggressive actions on the border issue. From the perspective of the China-US-India strategic triangle relationship, the factors discussed below have contributed to the changes in US attitudes on this issue. In the long run, in the strategic triangle, the US can benefit from confrontations between China and India. Sino-US relations and strategies toward China are the main element of US strategy, and Sino-India relations as well as Indo-US relations acts as a threshold for the US to intervene in Sino-Indian border issue. Pushed by the pandemic, US motives have become more distinct and obvious. First, Sino-US relations have changed from competition to intensified confrontation, which might increase the US motivation to intervene on the Sino-Indian border issue. At the same time, due to the impact of the pandemic and the conflict in the Galwan Valley, Sino-India relations have gradually become cold and even worsened instead of enjoying their previous stability. This has helped India to draw the US to their side. Under the influence of dual changes in Sino-US relations and Sino-Indian relations, India and the US have moved closer to each other toward more positive cooperation, which has increased the US capability to intervene. Also, changes in Sino-Indian relations and Indo-US relations have made it easier for the US to meddle. Therefore, with the pandemic and the changes in China-US-India triangle, it is observed that the US is more motivated and capable of intervening in the dispute. This has changed American attitudes on related issues.

Based on an analysis of the Doklam standoff and changes in the Sino-US-India triangle as well as US attitudes before and after the Galwan Valley event, we can see that the US and India have combined against China. Under such circumstances, the US will further increase its attention to the Sino-Indian border issue in favor of India, trying to exert more influence. On this occasion, a new question is to be explored: How will the US

attitude develop in the future? In what direction will the China-US-India triangle relationship develop?

Sui Xuemeng believes that Sino-US relations will head for confrontation and even conflict. This trend can be assessed from the recent US attitude toward China during the pandemic and US attempts to reshape the industrial chain. Tension over the border issue in Sino-Indian relations may gradually ease in the future, but considering the pandemic and previously highlighted contradictions in economics and trade between China and India, it is speculated that despite the detente, the relationship will still enter a frosty stage. Under the dual influence of Sino-US relations and Sino-India relations, Indo-US relations will develop toward a more positive direction. Influenced by this triangular relationship, US attitudes will change. On the one hand, the US will pay more attention to the disputes on Sino-Indian borders with an obvious biased stance toward India. On the other hand, the US will further try to get involved in related issues. However, due to the multiple impacts of the easing of Sino-Indian relations and India's need for a Sino-US balance, it may not be that easy for the US to arbitrarily interfere. Facing limits, US intervention might take the form of sending officials and military officers to visit the frontier on the pretext of mediation and arbitration, thus secretly supporting India.

In response to these new predicted changes, Sui Xuemeng put forward several questions. How will China deal with a coalition of the US and India, especially in regard to the Sino-Indian border dispute? How can the US factor be weakened? As the US attitudes toward the Sino-Indian border dispute are similar to the South China Sea dispute, it is worth considering the solution so as to provide some reference for resolving the South China Sea dispute.

Zhang Yang, a doctoral student at PKU's School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, India, analyzed *manthan*'s influence on Indian foreign policy against the backdrop of Sino-Indian border conflict. *Manthan* originated in the story of the Samudra Manthana, one of the best-known episodes in genesis mythology, which tells that the Devas (gods) and the Asuras (demons) churned the Ocean of Milk for the nectar of immortality. Legend has it that both the Asuras and the Devas were gods in the heavens, and there were constant wars between them, but it always ended in the victory of the Devas. The Devas finally were defeated by the Asuras, led

by Bali, and finally almost had nowhere to hide, so the Devas sought Lord Vishnu's help, who advised them to churn the ocean to obtain the nectar of immortality. Mount Mandara was used as the churning rod, and Vasuki, a serpent king, became the churning rope, and Vishnu transformed into the form of Kurma (a turtle), sinking into the bottom of the ocean to support the mountain on his shell, as the base of the rod. The vast Ocean of Milk was then stirred into grease, and treasures continuously appeared. During the churning process, venom escaped from the mouth of the serpent king since it could not withstand the huge pulling force. In order to prevent the poison (venom) from polluting the world, Shiva consumed the poison. When the nectar was finally churned, the Asuras refused to share. Vishnu therefore transformed into a beauty who fascinated the Asuras, and finally the nectar was shared by the Devas. Enraged, the Asuras went to war with the gods, but failed without the assistance of the nectar. Since then, they were driven out of the heavens and became synonymous with demons.

Zhang Yang believes that *manthan* is an important concept in the worldview of Indians, especially Hindus, revealing that chaos and disturbance are the natural state of the world. Success comes from reducing disadvantages and benefiting from advantages. Indian action in the Sino-Indian border confrontation in 2020 reflected the value that when you can advance, advance; when you need to retreat, then retreat; when you can obtain advantage, seek advantage and when you need to avoid harm, steer clear.

For example, in the Doklam standoff, India believed that China's road construction in the disputed area had changed the status quo, but did not stop its own plan to build Indian border roads. Even during the confrontation, India decided to send more workers to complete its infrastructure construction. India has always maintained a posture of advancing and safeguarding its own interests. With respect to its economy, India has banned 59 Chinese mobile phone apps since the end of June, and Modi closed his Sina Weibo account. On July 3, the Indian power department proposed restrictions on equipment imported from China. The conclusion can be drawn that by taking these economic measures, India hopes to protect its own interests as much as possible, while upgrading bilateral issues to attract international support.

Zhang Yang pointed out that *manthan* contains a behavioral concept of competition. In its territorial competition

with China, India aims at safeguarding its border interests, strenuously obstructing China's growth in power along the border, and thwarting Chinese border road construction, while continuously completing its own. The deep-rooted value drives India to continuously acquire advantage and avoid harmful interference. In fact, in Chinese civilization there are also ideas of "pursuing advantages and avoiding disadvantages." *The Book of Changes* mentions that one should do good things and be flexible, and everything in the world will comply with its own kind. In addition, there is also the concept, "Profit shall turn into its opposite if one pushes too far." These all indicate the Chinese pursuit of peace and moderation. On the contrary, *manthan* reflects extreme profit-seeking ideas, and even promises can be broken. When it comes to interests and competition, India tends not to give in and strives to safeguard its own interests, while Chinese civilization is more flexible and moderate. It is India's difference in values that leads to different measures taken in practice. There are variations in civilizations, but no superiority. Analyzing foreign policy from the perspective of traditional values is conducive to accurately grasping the motivation and logic behind the acts of states.

According to a comment made by Ye Hailin, a research fellow at the National Institute of International Strategy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), it is illogical for many to assume that India adopted its border policy due to domestic and international factors, and that the Indian government did so to shift domestic pressure over COVID-19.

First of all, is it the so-called distraction an Indian policy or just observers' imagination of Indian policy? If there is no first-hand evidence, it is not convincing. Second, in terms of political motivation, is nationalist sentiment in India — where the pandemic severity ranks number three globally — overestimated by the outside world? Will Indians ignore the health or even life and death of their relatives because of border disputes?

Moreover, dealing with border issues and fighting against the pandemic are two things that are not contradictory at all. The Indian government is capable of doing both at the same time. Therefore, in an analysis of the border disputes, many people fall into excessive mind reading wittingly or unwittingly, and their judgment is affected.

Ye Hailin pointed out that there are views that China and India can collaborate to combat COVID-19, so that India might not make trouble with China on the border issue. Is this suggestion practical? When academic analysis is translated into specific policy discussions, rash conclusions should be avoided. In addition, many believe that due to Indo-US relations, India's actions on the border are to please the US. Actually, both Indo-US relations and Sino-US relations have undergone great changes since 1962, but the border issue between China and India does not seem to be affected much or have experienced major changes, because it has its own logic.

Last, Ye Hailin said that, in general, discussions during the seminar reflected some concern over China-India relations in current domestic academia, especially about the border issue. For this reason, he also raised several questions. First, in the interaction between China and India, is it China or India that does not conform to the general behavior pattern of a country concerning a boundary issue? In fact, in terms of this issue, India's actions are not much different from those of most other countries. Advance when there is chance; refuse to make promises when one can't make progress, and break promises if necessary. This pattern may seem unfamiliar to China, but for other countries, in the past practice of international relations, it is actually normal state action. Therefore, when we see a divergence, it is worth judging who is acting out of order, China or India? Second is the prospects for future China-India interaction. Is Indian policy on China temporary, or will the border conflict become a turning point in the future development of relations? What's China's attitudes toward future Sino-Indian relations, and what are new strategies for the time being? Third, what role does the border issue play in the China-US-India triangle? Will the China-US-India triangle relationship be different without the border element?

Hu Shisheng, a research fellow at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, said in his comments that the actions conducted by the Modi government before and after the border conflict as well as demonstrating strength in diplomatic dialogue are all based on its comprehensive deliberation. Sino-Indian relations are no less complicated than Sino-US ones, because China and India are not only neighbors but also emerging powers with historical conflicts. The bilateral relations are intricate because both sides have their own considerations. Everything can happen. Therefore, when

studying an event, we must examine it on the vertical axis of time and horizontal axis of domestic and international environments.

From a historical perspective, there are lurking dangers in the past of Sino-Indian relations. The two countries are poles apart in their attitudes toward colonial systems, leading to problems at present. China deems the colonial system as a deep humiliation to the country, and could not wait to renounce it, while India appreciates it, because the British Empire colonization helped construct the basic framework for India. Therefore, different understandings of history will inevitably lead to disparate attitudes toward colonial legacies, including border issues, Tibet-related issues, and bilateral relations. These issues are structurally intractable, sometimes eased, sometimes tense. When studying the Sino-Indian relationship, a historical view of the origin of relations is significant and requires much attention.

In studying Sino-Indian relations, we should also pay attention to the worldview of different societies, including the traditional cultures and political environments in China and India. For example, in India the caste system plays a very important role in its diplomatic strategy. According to the system, people are born with various grades and ranks, and hereditary occupations are stressed, making the elites detached from the civilians. However, it is the elite class who are mainly responsible for setting the national diplomatic and security strategies. The view that “everyone is responsible for his country’s rise or fall” has long been held by Chinese. In the eyes of most Indian civilians, the view is “no one is responsible.”

Normally, strategic diplomacy by the elites mismatches with the daily demands of ordinary people. Therefore, India’s diplomatic strategy has remained aggressive as the pandemic situation was acute. Despite its poverty on a whole, India still cut off economic and trade relations with China. As two classes separate from each other, the elites sometimes even take advantage of mass dissatisfaction with the authorities.

In addition, different traditional cultures should also be considered. In addition to the aforementioned *manthan*, *mandala* thought is the logical base of many Indian diplomatic approaches. *Mandala* encourages people to win advantages when it is possible, and to forbear them when it is not. It also stresses that greater benefits can be obtained through

compulsion. *Mandala* is associated with strong pragmatism, and this principle has also been embodied in Modi's diplomacy. Recently, India showed off its diplomatic strength to China and provoked multiple confrontations along the border. These actions were closely related to the Indian country, national and cultural reconstruction promoted by Modi after he took office. Advocating a nationalist foreign policy and strong opposition to China, Modi is more likely to win great political support.

In conclusion, Prof. Qian Chengdan, director of PKUIAS, said that the New Buds Salon aims to be a platform for young researchers to voice their own opinions and understandings, train themselves in the process, and gradually become outstanding scholars. Today, speakers all expressed different views on Sino-India relations. The views are quite good for students who have not been in the academic research field for a long time. Nevertheless, there is still room for improvement. First, it is inadequate for several speakers to confine their speech on specific topics, generally on the Sino-Indian border issue. For research in one certain country or region, we must look for local information and materials so that more comprehensive and reasonable evidence can be found. We must make discussions with high caliber and strict norms. Second, solid basic skills are required in international studies. For example, when it comes to Sino-Indian relations, it is necessary to understand how the Sino-Indian relations used to be, what the "forward policy" is and what the so-called "scientific boundary" defined by Indians means. Without a sufficient understanding of these fundamentals, one cannot free his or her mind and observe China-India relations in an all-around view.

Prof. Zhai Kun, deputy director of PKUIAS, sketched out the future development direction of the New Buds Salon at the salon's conclusion. First, Zhai said it is necessary to conduct multiple academic discussions on a certain issue. As an example, the discussion today involved history, religion, culture, political science, and so on. In the future, sociology, anthropology and even natural sciences should be added, and diversity must be maintained. Second, being new and prominent requires both integrity and creativity. It is necessary to seek innovation in existing basic research and improve individual critical and innovative capabilities. Some habitually agreed-upon viewpoints need to be challenged. Third, selectivity must be highlighted. For topics in a certain field, it is necessary

to select participants from across the country to discover representative viewpoints in different disciplines. Finally, an academic network is expected to form. PKUIAS should not only promote area studies within the campus, but also strive to unite domestic and foreign experts and scholars at home and abroad to promote area studies on a larger scale.



**The 20th New Buds Salon  
Relations between China and its Neighbors after  
COVID-19: Japan**

**July 15, 2020**

It has been a once-in-a-century challenge for China to combat COVID-19, which broke out at the start of 2020. The pandemic not only altered people's lifestyles, but also brought tremendous changes to China's surrounding environment. To this end, the Institute of Area Studies, Peking University (PKUIAS) organized a series of New Buds salons under the theme "Relations between China and its neighbors after COVID-19," inviting young scholars at home and abroad to discuss the development of China's relations with neighboring regions and countries. This salon focused on the future of Sino-Japan relations. The meeting was chaired by Xu Chuanbo, a postdoctoral fellow of PKUIAS.

A presentation by You Kaiyu, a postdoctoral fellow at PKU's School of International Studies, centered on how China responded to the situation of Japanese seeking to shift the industrial chain away from China. His speech was divided into four sections. First, he introduced the background of Abe's subsidy policy behind the industrial chain shift. Second, the reasons for this policy was analyzed. Third, he discussed the responses China will take. Fourth, he summarized his conclusions.

You Kaiyu first discussed the subsidy system to shift the industrial chain. In April 2020, the Abe government initiated a "Subsidy System to Promote Supply Chain Shift." This aimed to encourage industrial chain production (procurement and supply networks of parts and materials) to return to Japan. It also aimed to diversify Japanese overseas industrial production. Initiatives to return production home enjoyed a budget of 220 billion yen in total (approximately 14.5 billion yuan) to provide subsidies covering three-fourths of equipment costs for companies that move their production back to Japan. For initiatives to diversify production, the government prepared 23.5 billion yen to support Japanese companies who shift their overseas production bases away from China to other countries.。

According to You Kaiyu, this policy was driven by three motives. First, COVID-19 has caused a great impact on Japan's

economy and domestic employment. Factors such as sluggish consumption, declining foreign trade, reduced tourism income, reduced production supply, and rising production costs have caused Japan's economic growth rate to drop to -5 percent. Meanwhile, facing heavy domestic employment stress, the authorities had to introduce this policy to realize the aim of developing the economy and increasing employment. Second, this pandemic has made Japan aware of the fragility of the international industrial chain and the risk of excessive economic dependence on China. At the beginning of the outbreak, measures taken by the Chinese government such as closing factories and restricting the movement of people disrupted the supply of parts and components in some industries. Japan's domestic production capacity for medical protective materials was curbed and materials were in short supply. Third, the Japanese government wishes to cooperate with the industrial chain "de-sinicization" of the Trump administration, to counterbalance China, thus gaining strategic superiority in the Sino-US strategic game.

In response to the negative impact of Abe's policy to shift industry out of China, You Kaiyu believes that China should focus on improving industrial automation and intelligence, regain manufacturing cost advantages, develop a digital economy to reduce service costs, and consolidate its position as a hub on the global industrial chain. Since China is about to lose its comparative advantage of labor costs, the country should introduce industrial robots on a large scale, improve the automation and intelligence level of manufacturing, reduce production costs, and take advantage of its complete industrial system, complete industrial chain and broad market to maintain its position as the hub of the global industrial chain and supply chain. In the meantime, confronted with rising service costs in factories, China should make effective use of the digital economy and actively utilize e-commerce and blockchain technology on the basis of information and communication services to gradually expand the scale of online transactions and facilitate cross-border e-commerce transactions, thus reducing the costs of obtaining business information and transactions. To defend the pivotal position of the global industrial chain, the key lies in giving full play to the consumer market and improving the industrial system.

All in all, although the Abe government is trying to make Japanese industrial chains in China move back home or shift

away to Southeast Asia, the policy will have little effect on the industrial structure. Japanese low-end manufacturing may shift to Southeast Asia and other regions with lower labor costs due to factors such as rising labor costs in China, but in the short term, high-end manufacturing is unlikely to move away. There is a vast market and a complete industrial system in China, together with growing automation in manufacturing and the rapid development of the digital economy. These factors will all add to China's edge in production costs and service costs, which will further lead the integration of the global industrial chain.

Ma Yimin, a PhD student of the Department of Economics, Nagoya University, focused his speech on the recent trends in Japanese politics regarding the Hong Kong issue. The speech was divided into four parts. The first part introduces the attitudes of the Japanese government on the Hong Kong issue. The second part focuses on the ruling party in order to analyze the behavior and internal logic of Japanese politics. The third part analyzes various politicians by centering on an individual politician. The fourth part studies the influence of Japan's political and social environment on the development of Sino-Japanese relations.

First, regarding the Hong Kong issue, the Japanese government kept a low-key attitude to avoid provoking China, and did not participate in the activities of the US, the UK, Australia and Canada. However, with the convening of the G7 summit, Japan changed its attitude and adopted a clearer critical stance. Ma Yimin believed that this change is more symbolic than practical. As a member of the G7, Japan is merely fulfilling its obligations, maintaining its presence and voice in the G7 organization and mainstream developed countries, and showing the US its determination to safeguard the Japan-US alliance as well as the interests of developed countries. Generally speaking, though Japan's attitude toward China on the Hong Kong issue has gradually altered, it maintains restraint and prudence. The behaviors of the Japanese government at this time were mainly driven by the people, China-Japan economic and trade relations, and allies, especially the US.

Second, an examination of Japanese political trends on the Hong Kong issue reveals that, with the exception of a handful of small and medium-sized parties such as the Japan Restoration Party and the Japanese Communist Party, most parties stated their views with a mild and ambiguous accent. The main leaders of various parties have called for "restraint." In fact, generally

Japanese political parties have not taken any further practical actions on the Hong Kong issue. On the other hand, opposition parties tried to exert pressure on Abe's cabinet with the Hong Kong issue, demonstrating their rejection of Abe's long-term regime. As for the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), its radical attitude was actually for protection of the Abe regime, since it not only catered to the mainstream of Japanese and Western society, but also demonstrated that the ruling party agreed with dominant values in Europe and America as well as Japan, and also avoided provoking China with an authoritative statement. On this occasion, active statements by other opposition parties seem like they were using the topic to make a fuss, insinuate against and even resisting Abe's long-term regime. With the stability of the Shinzo Abe regime and the weakening of opposition parties, the LDP and the bureaucracy has gradually shared more common interests, leaving little space for opposition parties. In May 2020, Hiromu Kurokawa's resignation was regarded as an administrative intervention in the judicial system, which coincided with the Hong Kong issue and therefore became material for the opposition parties to insinuate that the Abe regime's long-term governance has eroded the Japanese judiciary.

Third, compared to the collective prudence of parties, Japanese politicians have been more active in their personal activities and expressions on the Hong Kong issue. Partisan politicians, politicians without party membership, and some former government bureaucrats frequently spoke about and planned various activities concerning the topic. Their primary aim was to enhance their public reputation in the country and win the support of voters. Some politicians carried out activities as individuals or in groups, expanding their influence through party proposals, organizing seminars, voices on online platforms, freelance writing and media interviews. Generally speaking, individual politicians' attitudes on the issue are vacillating. Domestic politics in Japan attracts them more, and their political activities are "introverted," with local voters as their focus.

Ma Yimin pointed out that Japanese political attitudes on the Hong Kong issue are not purely a diplomatic matter. For the Japanese central government, the Hong Kong issue is not only related to relations between countries and Japan's status in international society, but is also linked to the influence and legitimacy of the LDP ruling party at home. For opposition

parties and individual politicians, although the Hong Kong issue is directed at China, the Abe government and the LDP it represents are actually their real target, so the issue is an effective means for them to challenge the government and the ruling party and win over political resources. All in all, various Japanese political statements on the Hong Kong issue are closely related to Japan's domestic political environment in recent years. In the context of Abe's long-term administration, represented by the ruling party, in Japan there has appeared a trend of "reaction" toward European and American populism and "centralization" in decision-making. The dominance of the LDP and the allure of government power have put pressure on small- and medium-sized parties whose dissatisfaction is amassing. That's why opposition parties took a radical attitude and made a fuss.

Xu Yirao, a doctoral student of the Graduate Schools for Law and Politics at the University of Tokyo, gave a speech titled "Will the 'honeymoon period' of the Japan-Vietnam relationship cool down?" Centering on the relationship between the Vietnam and Japanese government during the Abe regime, Xu's speech had three parts. The first part introduced overall development of Japan-Vietnam relations, the second explained various issues in the honeymoon period, and the last was a summary of Japan-Vietnam relations.

Since Abe came to power in 2013, Japan and Vietnam have seen more high-level visits and increasingly deepened political relations, reaching an unprecedented closeness. Japan and Vietnam have also expanded economic cooperation focusing on trade, aid, investment, and so on. The bilateral trade volume between Japan and Vietnam rose from \$25 billion in 2014 to \$37.87 billion in 2018. Since 1992, to Vietnam, Japan has always been the largest source of official development assistance. In 2018, Japanese investment in Vietnam reached \$8.6 billion, becoming its largest investment source. In addition, the two countries have continuously strengthened their cooperation in the security field, especially on the South China Sea issue. There have been frequent exchange visits of military officials between Japan and Vietnam. In 2015, the Japan-Vietnam Strategic Partnership Dialogue framework was established. In 2016, the Deputy Ministerial Defense Policy Dialogue and Deputy Ministerial Consultation Mechanism of the Police Department were established, striving for a "3+3" mechanism where officials from foreign affairs, defense, and

maritime security departments of Japan and Vietnam can participate in talks. Furthermore, Japan has also provided Vietnam with a large amount of marine equipment and military training assistance to improve Vietnamese maritime law enforcement capabilities. Japan has also taken an active part in various bilateral or multilateral military exercises to strengthen the strategic docking of warships and warplanes at important ports in Vietnam, reinforcing Japan-Vietnam security cooperation. It can be seen that Abe's keen efforts have brought Japan-Vietnam relations to an unprecedented height, and led to a smooth "honeymoon period." However, due to contradictions in Abe's own policies and some inherent problems in Japanese diplomacy, there are undercurrents of risks beneath the calm surface of this "honeymoon."

There are three problems lurking in the "honeymoon period" of the Japan-Vietnam relationship. First, Shinzo Abe's "values diplomacy" casts a shadow. For a long time, Japan's diplomacy was based on pragmatism and emphasized interests over values, which was welcomed by developing countries. However, when Abe led the cabinet for the second time, he combined the ideological "values diplomacy" with the fully realist "Indo-Pacific strategy" and made peaceful evolution part of his diplomacy with Vietnam. At the realist international political level, Vietnam has become a target that Japan needs to woo, but meanwhile it is also an "alien" in "values diplomacy." Driven by this contradiction, Japan has vigorously approached Vietnam in recent years while trying to infiltrate and promote the peaceful evolution. This contributed to conflicts and confrontations in future Japan-Vietnam relations. Second, historical issues are also obstacles in their relations. During World War II, Japan once invaded Vietnam and caused the 1945 Great Famine in North Vietnam, a subject that cannot be skirted. With its own diplomatic advantages, Japan has adopted an attitude of playing down and denying history, and replaced apology and compensation with economic assistance. Nevertheless, factors such as Vietnam's economic development, policy changes and emerging nationalist sentiments will have a huge impact on Japan-Vietnam relations. In addition, the non-governmental relations between Japan and Vietnam are also changing. There are far fewer Japanese in Vietnam than Vietnamese in Japan. With problems of crime, illegal employment and cultural conflicts brought about by Vietnamese immigrants, the negative perception of Vietnam by Japanese

citizens will surge. Correspondingly, Vietnamese understanding of Japan is also changing, and Japan's national image has begun to worsen in Vietnam.

Xu Yirao believes that the future of Japan-Vietnam relations is still full of twists and turns. While pursuing a realist foreign policy, Shinzo Abe also mixed it with values diplomacy. He forced the goal of liberalism into his realist diplomatic strategy, aspiring to achieve a balance of power and interfere with the political system of other countries at the same time. In the end, there must be a paradox. The development of the Japan-Vietnam relationship was based on Vietnam's determination to develop its all-round diplomatic standing since the 1990s and its strategy of balancing major external powers, together with its yearning for economic development. However, relations with Japan are not a decisive aspect in Vietnam's diplomacy. There is no doubt that the rising power of China as a neighbor is showing its attraction, thus influencing or even determining Japan-Vietnam relations.

Kenichi Doi, a doctoral student of the Graduate School of Education at PKU, addressed the history and characteristics of Japan's multilateral health cooperation and Japan's multilateral cooperation in the context of COVID-19.

Doi first introduced the history of Japan's multilateral health cooperation, which is mainly based on Japan's official development assistance (ODA). The level of Japanese ODA has undergone several important changes. Before 1997, ODA continued to increase with the continuous growth of Japan's overall national strength. In 1997, it began to decline and did not recover until 2015. In the meantime, supporting and funding international organizations was also an important way for Japan to participate in multilateral cooperation. In this way, Japanese government wanted to improve the professionalism of international organizations, enhance Japan's influence in organizations and then promote the Japanese model to the world.

Since the outbreak of COVID-19, thanks to continuous closer cooperation between China and Japan in international development in recent years, both countries have made significant contributions to the international community. After an exchange of high-level visits between China and Japan in 2018, the two sides reached a consensus and agreed to strengthen dialogue and talent exchanges in international development, enhance cooperation in traditional international

organizations such as the United Nations, and encourage private enterprises to participate in international cooperation to build a new type of multilateral cooperative agency. In addition, the two sides also bolster regional cooperation through the “ASEAN+3” mechanism and boost healthy regional competition.

Last, in the view of Doi, post-war global health governance was developed with the World Health Organization (WHO) as its hub. In the 21st century, with emerging actors entering, coping with various diseases and strengthening international cooperation requires all countries to provide indispensable international public goods. Against the backdrop of global crisis triggered by the COVID-19, multilateral cooperation is facing enormous challenges. The US has indicated that it would withdraw from the WHO, while China is strengthening cooperation with the organization. When the two great powers acted in opposite ways, Japan has adopted a policy of strengthening multilateral cooperation. On this basis, Japan will further participate in international public health affairs and strengthen multilateral health cooperation.

Natsuki Momiji, a graduate student of PKU’s School of International Studies, discussed China-Japan relations and the similarities in pandemic prevention and control models between China and Japan. To begin with, she compared the differences in pandemic prevention and control measures between China and Japan, and from an international perspective, focused on the attitudes China and Japan adopted toward the efforts of the international community. Finally, she discussed the similarities between China and Japan in pandemic prevention and control measures.

When reviewing the measures taken by the Chinese and Japanese governments during the pandemic, we can find the prevention and control models of the two countries are in sharp contrast. Chinese measures are characterized by comprehensive control, while Japanese actions featured precise attacks. In China, all the “lines” and “planes” through which the virus may spread are strictly supervised, thereby achieving a loophole-free situation. In Japan, all cases are distinguished as individual infections and outbreaks, or mild cases and severe cases. Limited resources are effectively invested in outbreaks to achieve low-cost and high-efficiency prevention and control.

Although the models of China and Japan are different, we can still see some similarities against the general background of the international community. There are mainly two aspects. One



is that, in terms of the effects of pandemic prevention and control, China and Japan were both successful. The two countries have moved past the pandemic crisis and have begun to resume normal production and daily life. The other aspect is that both China and Japan promoted the effectiveness of their prevention and control modes. China has always attached importance to the role of the WHO and coordinated policies with the WHO in a timely manner. The WHO also spoke highly of Chinese achievements in disease prevention and control. The Chinese government also promoted its successful anti-epidemic model to the world through the media. In addition, the Chinese government has actively exported medical materials and encouraged countries to learn from its successful experience. The Japanese pandemic prevention model has also been recognized by the world and has been regarded as a successful experience by the UN secretary-general. In this sense, China and Japan share similar internal and external publicity ideas. Both countries valued the positive evaluation of their own measures from international organizations, trying to establish their own models and wishing for other countries to follow. But actually, both the high degree of compulsion in the Chinese model and the high degree of initiative in Japanese model are based on the organizational forms of the two governments — the governments both enjoy great centralized state power. In addition, cooperation between the state and its people is also a key factor.

It is worth considering the development of Sino-Japanese relations in the context of pandemic prevention and control. With Sino-US relations deteriorating, the US regarded health cooperation and foreign aid from China as threats, resulting in the politicization of pandemic prevention and control. However, China and Japan can still deepen bilateral relations through medical cooperation and even collaboration in other health fields. At the same time, the pragmatic tendency of Japanese diplomacy is also conducive to cooperation between the two countries. During the pandemic, Japan's diplomacy with China was mainly manifested in three aspects. First, instead of blaming China, the Japanese government recognized that it was the second wave of virus transmission that led to the spread of the pandemic in Japan. Second, the Japanese government did not politicize China's medical assistance during the pandemic. Third, Japan's refusal to participate in criticizing China shows that Japanese government is still in hesitation. Despite a series

of uncertain factors, Japan has shown a diplomatic posture opposite to that of the US.

Finally, Momiji believes that Chinese pandemic prevention is “strongly controlled” and Japan is “highly proactive.” Both models require strong national governance, demanding not only a certain technological capability, but also the cooperation between the authorities and citizens. To what extent such cooperation can be realized depends on the content of a pandemic prevention and control strategy. This is also based on the actual conditions of two countries.

Keisuke Niwa, a graduate student at Schwarzman College, Tsinghua University, gave a speech titled “Japanese Companies Turning to ‘De-Sinicization?’” He concludes that Japanese companies will not turn to “de-sinicization.”

According to Niwa, as the pandemic spread, the greatest concern for Japanese companies was supply chain disruption. If manufacturers in China suspended production, the supply chain would be disrupted, making sales and production more difficult. In April 2020, the Japanese government announced a “supply chain reform” plan, with a budget of 250 billion yen to support Japanese companies in relocating their production bases for medical supplies and high value-added products back to Japan, or moving them to ASEAN countries. This is the first time that the Japanese government directly assisted companies to shift their global supply chain.

However, this subsidy will not lead to the “de-sinicization” of Japanese companies. The history of Japanese supply chain strategies shows that, since the 1990s, Japanese companies have begun to move their domestic production overseas to cope with the rapid appreciation of the yen after the “Plaza Accord.” The 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake destroyed part of the domestic supply chain, and further prompted Japanese companies to move their production overseas. China, with a large market and rapid economic growth, has therefore become a major area for Japanese manufacturing. After the spread of SARS in 2003 and the deterioration of Sino-Japanese relations in 2005, Japanese companies began to implement a “China +1” strategy to disperse their manufacturing bases to ASEAN and other countries to prevent clusters of production in China. However, at present, it is unlikely that all the manufacturing bases will be shifted to ASEAN, where infrastructure, related industries and human capital are inferior to China. Relocation would also cause Japanese companies to lose their Chinese

market. At present, COVID-19 will not prompt Japanese companies to shift their production.

There are two reasons. The first is that production facilities in high value-added industries that require a complex supply chain are unlikely to be moved away from China. The other is that, as Chinese national income increases, China's demand for high value-added products will grow accordingly, and Japanese companies cannot bear the risk of losing the Chinese market.

It is worth noting that the pandemic did encourage Japanese companies to make some changes. Due to the Chinese government's restrictions on international travel, Japanese companies have been reluctant to send personnel to China. Since the absence of Japanese personnel rarely affected company operation, Japanese companies will realize that it is not necessary to send personnel to China, which will further promote the localization of production in China. In addition, Japanese companies are obviously not doing well in localization, with Japanese resident personnel occupying management positions and Chinese employees losing their opportunities for promotion. As a result, the enthusiasm of Chinese employees is undermined. What's worse, since Japanese managers cannot fully understand the peculiarities of Chinese society and the Chinese market, they can neither promote business nor achieve better field management. In short, under the impact of COVID-19, though the Japanese government introduced a supply chain reform policy, it cannot effectively persuade Japanese companies to shift their production. At the same time, influenced by the pandemic, Japanese companies will change their own management strategies by strengthening localization and appointing Chinese local managers to enhance their own competitiveness.

Lü Yaodong, a research fellow of the Institute of Japanese Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), offered his comments on the presentations. First, under the influence of COVID-19, the supply chain disruption of Japanese companies is the main reason for the Japanese government to put forward its industry shift policy. Faced with challenges brought by this policy, China should actively consider what measures to take. Second, although there have been some changes in the Japanese government's attitude toward China, opinion divisions among various parties will not affect final decisions of the government. In fact, changes for the time being are mainly caused by external factors. The attitude of the

Japanese government is largely driven by Japan-US relations and the G7 members. Third, security cooperation remains at the core of Japan-Vietnam relations, and Japan's values diplomacy has indeed exerted an important impact on the relations. From this perspective, we can further discover that when Vietnam is gradually drawing close to European and American countries, for the Vietnamese government, is there any thought of ensuring its own rule as well as national security?

This discovery will be of strong academic value for issues beyond the honeymoon period of current Japan-Vietnam relationship.

Fourth, there is bound to be a directional problem regarding multilateral cooperation after the pandemic. In this case, how China and Japan will conduct market cooperation is worth attention. Fifth, it is commendable to compare the pandemic prevention and control efforts of China and Japan. As the conclusion is similarities outweigh differences, plus mutual assistance and cooperation remains the key of pandemic prevention and control, China and Japan will continue to maintain their trend of cooperation. Sixth, the de-sinicization of Japanese companies has actually gone from quantitative change to qualitative change. With the growth of China's economy and changes in the economic development model, de-sinicization is constantly being pushed ahead. It is not a problem that arose after the outbreak of COVID-19, but in fact a problem that has normalized. How should China respond to this? This issue deserves further consideration.

Finally, Lü Yaodong held that the pandemic is an international public security issue that involves the common interests of the international community. Countries in the world should adopt a cooperative attitude rather than a confrontational view. At present, the reason why the US behaves in this way is that it simply considers its own interests while abandoning the common good. However, a major power is expected to shoulder its responsibilities and to deal with international relations and international affairs based on public interests and the common interests of all mankind.

Concerning these speeches, Prof. Chu Xiaobo of PKU's School of International Studies pointed out the following problems. The first is academic attitude. He said research aims to describe, explain and predict future development as objectively and rationally as possible. It is this goal that differentiates the works of scholars from news media opinions

or blogging. Scholars should state facts as much as possible, make value judgments as cautiously as possible, and avoid using emotional words. Now in China there is “wolf warrior diplomacy,” and there are also “wolf warrior papers” in our academia. Therefore, scholars should reflect, put themselves in someone else’s shoes, try to understand the research objects when designing methods, and avoid talking to himself all along or judging others. When comparing the pandemic prevention and control methods in China and Japan, we must avoid logical errors in attribution. The success of the so-called “Japanese model” is not only attributed to the efforts of Japanese government, but also inseparable from the quality and tolerance of Japanese people.

Second is the selection of materials. Academic research is nothing more than studying certain materials and drawing certain conclusions through certain methods. However, it is impossible to do real academic research only by listing the facts. During the selection process, if we do not distinguish different materials and just regard texts as facts when we come across them, no objective and accurate research results can be obtained. For example, when the “China School” in Japan changed their friendly attitude toward China over the Hong Kong issue, we should analyze not only their rephrasing, but also the logic behind it. When studying the supply chain shift policy of Japanese government, budget figures are not the only concern, as the actual situation also deserves attention.

The third is research methods. Scholars must have clear theoretical awareness and analytical logic to avoid eclecticism, so young scholars must form their own research methods. For example, You Kaiyu and Niwa’s analysis of the Japanese corporate industrial chain belongs to the research field of industrial economics. However, economics has its own research premises, research methods and research ideas. Therefore, we cannot simply combine it with realist interest analysis, ignoring professionalism as well as a strict definition of concepts.

The fourth is about knowledge system development. At present, the fragmentation of our knowledge system is a very serious problem, including fragmented knowledge systems and fragmented analysis methods. With a clear conscience, people are getting used to accepting all kinds of information, even contradictory information. Eventually, academic research becomes a patchwork of random pieces. As Schopenhauer said, “One can’t let his brain become the arena of someone else’s

thoughts.” Therefore, young scholars should read classics in a holistic and comprehensive manner according to their own interests and expertise. They should master research methods and research materials, incorporate practical issues into long-term thinking with a broader perspective and analyze issues of concern with their own frames of thought.

Prof. Zhai Kun, deputy director of PKUIAS, summarized the goals of the New Buds Salon. He believes that the wide coverage of this salon will help form a research network for young scholars, create more opportunities for academic discussions, thus forming an academic community.