The 48th lecture in the “Adventus Amicorum” salon series, hosted by the Institute of Area Studies at Peking University (PKUIAS), was held on April 7, 2025. The lecturer was Yves Sintomer, a professor of Political Science at the University of Paris 8. In the lecture, Sintomer shared his insights on the topic, “Far-Right Populism in Europe in the Trump Era.” The event was moderated by Duan Demin, an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at the School of Government, Peking University. The discussants were Cui Zhiyuan, a professor at the Tsinghua Institute for Advanced Study in Humanities and Social Sciences, and Zhang Yongle, a professor at Peking University Law School and deputy director of PKUIAS.
The lecture began with an observation on a striking and unsettling comment made by US Vice President J.D. Vance, who recently told European leaders that “the enemy is within.” Reflecting on this statement, Prof. Sintomer argued that the real danger facing Europe today is the rise of right-wing populism. From this starting point, he traced the emergence of what he termed an “international far-right,” whose leaders from the US, Europe, and Latin America are now engaging in dialogue, attending common forums, and exchanging strategic narratives.
Prof. Sintomer categorized five distinct social constituencies that support the far right: the “far right in ties” (capitalists), “in uniforms” (military and security forces), “in sweatshirts” (high-tech CEOs), “in blue jeans” (white blue-collar workers and drivers working for Uber), and “in rags” (the lumpen-proletariat). At the ideological level, the far right is shaped by four main currents: Christian fundamentalists, particularly evangelical movements in the Americas; anti-state (techno-) libertarians, who oppose the state both economically and culturally; national populists, who form the core of far-right electoral support in Europe; and fascist-influenced trends, which are more prominent in Latin America but present elsewhere as well.
Despite their diverse backgrounds, these groups are united by what Prof. Sintomer identified as six common imaginaries: “cleansing nationalism” targeting migrants, Islam and multicultural society; “people’s sovereignty” against “globalism” outside, against the rule of law, checks and balances and constitutionalism inside; popular resentment against both elites and the “undeserving poor”; calls for security, order, and military strength; opposition to “woke culture”; and skepticism toward ecology and the green transition. However, these imaginaries are not without contradictions. The far right is divided on key questions, including the role of the state, geopolitical alignment, cultural norms, and attitudes toward modernity.
The lecture then turned to the European context, where the far right has taken on specific forms shaped by history, religion, and political institutions. Compared to the US or Latin America, the European far right draws less on tech elites or security forces, and more on the traditional working class and petite bourgeoisie. Ideologically, Europe’s far-right is less religious, less militant, and more fragmented than its American counterpart. Institutionally, the EU’s proportional electoral systems and fragmented party landscape have shaped the far right’s strategy: alliances with the traditional right. Meanwhile, far-right discourse has grown increasingly hegemonic, influencing mainstream narratives on migration, gender, and academic freedom.
Zooming out, Prof. Sintomer offered a panoramic view of Europe’s far right in European elections. Country case studies further reveal the varied nature of European far-right populism. In Germany and Poland, support is strongest in economically depressed areas and former borderlands—Phantomgrenzen (“phantom borders”). In France, Marine Le Pen’s party draws heavily from working-class voters, particularly in post-industrial regions. Italy, by contrast, is an outlier: far-right strength lies in wealthier northern regions and spans class lines. Austria, Hungary, and the Netherlands show further diversity, with similar social bases but differing cultural outlooks—from Catholic conservatism to secular nationalism. Bringing these threads together, Prof. Sintomer proposed a typology of European far-right formations from two dimensions: cultural constituency and social constituency.
In the final part of his lecture, Prof. Sintomer turned to the underlying factors of this transformation. He argued that the rise of the far right cannot be understood without acknowledging the decline of Europe’s socioeconomic and political systems. Europe’s share of global GDP has steadily declined; its welfare states are under fiscal and political pressure; traditional political parties have lost their grassroots bases; and major policy initiatives—like the green transition or gender equality—have triggered a backlash among segments of the population that feel excluded or overburdened. Compounding this is a growing legitimacy crisis in Europe’s foreign policy, where double standards over Ukraine and Palestine have damaged the EU’s image as a defender of human rights. Domestically, many Europeans now see liberal democracy as a system dominated by elites, offering limited choices and failing to deliver results.
Prof. Sintomer concluded on a cautionary note. Simply denouncing far-right populism as dangerous or irrational is insufficient. Without substantial reform—economic, institutional, and cultural—Europe’s liberal order will remain vulnerable.
In the discussion session, the three discussants and other participants held in-depth exchanges with Prof. Sintomer on various topic, including correlations between classes and parties, the influence of change in the global political landscape, the terminology and self-consciousness of developing and developed countries, and the attitudes toward “outsiders”. The lecture concluded amid further discussions.
